



# FORESEC Deliverable D 2.2 Country report on Estonia

**16 June 2008**

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## Introduction

This country report on Estonia represents one of the 12 country reports that have been compiled as part of the FORESEC project's State of the Art Scan on European security (see further about the project at [www.foresec.eu](http://www.foresec.eu)). The Scan provides an overview of the security field in the 12 countries chosen. The countries have been selected to give a good overview of the different cultures, geographical locations, national strategies and societal challenges that face European security and shape the priorities and interest at the European level.<sup>1</sup>

Section 1 of the report discusses the concept of security in Bulgaria, sections 2 looks at the current security related activities including organisations, strategies and doctrines, role of the private sector, key technologies and current research programs and projects. Section 3 discusses the public opinion in Estonia vis-à-vis security threats and technologies. Section 4 gives an overview of current national and international foresight activities and section 5 highlights issues where European level collaboration is seen to have most added value. Further details concerning each section are provided in the Appendix.

### 1. Concept of Security

The Estonian concept of security has been dominated by the accession strategy to NATO and EU ever since the independence in 1991. The concepts and definitions surrounding security and its different dimensions such as state, societal and human security are relatively new to Estonians and Estonia is only starting to develop its internal security strategy. The newly independent Estonia has had a tremendous task of creating a new political environment and at the same time constructing a whole new economic and legislative environment. On top of this, societal security threats in the form of transnational crime and narcotics smuggling have caused significant societal problems in Estonia. Societal security has been defined by the interviewed experts as society's well being, ranging from individual's economic and social wellbeing to collective societal trust in the political order and the state's capacity to provide personal and financial security to its general public. Societal security is a relatively unknown term in Estonia and security is more often perceived as containing military components.

Estonia is situated on the coast of the Baltic Sea region. With an area of 45,000 km<sup>2</sup> Estonia is a small country by world standards. Estonia shares a land border with Russia and Latvia and, in addition, a sea border with Finland and Sweden, covering more than half of the total border. About 1.3 million people inhabit Estonia, which is low-lying but rich in natural landscapes. Almost one-third of the population lives in Tallinn, the capital city. Having been a part of the Russian Empire for roughly two and a half centuries the country has since the second half of the 1980s drawn the attention of the international community to its peaceful struggle to gain its independence. This cherished goal was attained on 20 August 1991, making Estonia one of the several newcomers to Europe.<sup>2</sup>

The 1994-2004 period was mainly dominated by the Estonian EU and NATO accession processes. EU accession negotiations proceeded rapidly, and Estonia joined the EU in May 2004, along with nine other countries, including its Baltic neighbours. The final decision was conditional on the outcome of a national referendum which was held in September 2003 and returned a large majority in favour of membership. In November 2002, Estonia was one of seven Central and East European countries to be invited to join NATO; it officially became a member of NATO on March 29, 2004. In

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<sup>1</sup> The FORESEC state of the art scan covers Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom

<sup>2</sup> Crime and Society – Estonia <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/europe/estonia.html>

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just fifteen years since re-establishing independence Estonia has developed into a strong international actor, through its membership in the EU and NATO.

There is an apparent difference in the English terms 'safety' and 'security' in the Estonian concept of security. The definition of security is perceived by most stakeholders to signify some intentional negative action, i.e. an intentional threat to security. Safety is usually used when relating to a specific topic such as traffic safety.

Nevertheless, there has been some confusion between safety and security in the Estonian language, especially in the media and in the public opinion, but at present there is a clear difference between security (*turvalisuu*, *julgeolek*) and safety (*ohutus*)

Against a backdrop of a reduced military threat, rapid changes in the international arena, in economy and in technology have brought a number of so-called new, non-military risks to the fore. On a global scale these new trends and projections include ecological risks, the potential for ethnic conflict, international organised crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the potential volatility of social and economic problems. All of these so-called new risks have the potential to influence Estonia either directly or indirectly. Particularly in the Baltic Sea region, Soviet-era nuclear energy plants heighten the danger of ecological catastrophe, as do other large industries such as chemical producing plants. In addition to ecological danger, economic and humanitarian catastrophes may result in floods of refugees and widespread in-migration, both of which have the potential to de-stabilise the states of the region. A number of factors, with a potential to influence Estonia's domestic security, stem from the great economic and social transformation that the region is undergoing. The speedy pace of change brings with it the danger of a widening socio-economic gap. This, in turn, increases social problems such as crime and substance abuse. The explosive growth of post-Cold War phenomena such as international organised crime and terrorism, as well as smuggling of narcotics and arms, among other things, can also influence Estonian society. The increasing use of electronic information systems in Estonia and their interconnectedness with global information systems increases the risk of computer crime as well as the vulnerability of the national information system. These new security risks demand a co-ordinated response by national institutions and broad international co-operation.

## **2. Current security related activities**

Cooperation at Ministry level is somewhat hindered by ministries being fairly independent from each other. The NATO/EU agenda has been strong since 1994 and this has influenced the ministerial cooperation. Cooperation between ministries has in the 10 years since independence been structured so that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been focused on attaining membership in EU and the Ministry of Defence has concentrated on Estonia's NATO membership. Several stakeholders commented on the fact that some MoD officials are better acquainted with their NATO counterparts than with their Estonian colleagues in other ministries. Strategies concerning internal security and citizen security are under development and the situation regarding the strategies and the field of organisations related to security might change in the next 10 years.

Cooperation at grassroots level, between first responders is functioning well. This was witnessed during the April 2007 riots (the statue conflict) during which the first responders worked and communicated well with each other. The lesson learnt, according to the stakeholders interviewed, was that the Ministry of Defence is not flexible enough to act instantly in such a situation. A number of stakeholders indicated that the government needs to revise its reaction in situations of crisis.

There is some research conducted in Estonia on societal issues related to security but the majority of research is on the role of accession to NATO and EU for Estonia.

### **2.1 Organisations**

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The main organisation in charge of citizen security in Estonia is the **Ministry of the Interior**. There are different agencies working under the Ministry of the Interior such as the Board of Border Guard, the Police Board, the Rescue Board, the Citizenship and Migration Board and the Security Police Board.

The main tasks of the Ministry of the Interior, in ensuring physical security, are the protection of public order and fight against crime, border control and guarding, maintaining the border regime, civil protection, and management of fire fighting and rescue works. The issues of data protection and ensuring the functioning of the infrastructure systems demand increased attention. Increasing use of electronic information technology both in public and private spheres and integration of the electronic information systems into the global information network has had a considerable positive effect. This process, though, brings about factors that increase risk of computer crimes and vulnerability of information systems. Special attention must therefore be paid to ensuring the security of government databases and registers. In the creation and development of the legal basis regulating this sphere the state must safeguard national interests, including security interests, and the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals; the state must also ensure the effective administration of government databases and registers. The aim is to avert with the help of legal regulation the misuse of sensitive information against the national interests of Estonia and against the rights of its citizens.<sup>3</sup>

The Border Guard is organised under the Ministry of the Interior. Effective border control is one of the main tasks of an independent country. The Estonian border guard has created a border control system that is compatible with the EU regulations. Integration into Europe added significance to border guard activities, as security of all countries depend on the protection of the border of any single country. Estonia's eastern border has become EU's external border. The Estonian Border Guard is an armed organisation that falls under the administrative branch of the Ministry of Interior but the structure of the organisation is military. The task of the Estonian border guard is to prevent illegal crossing of the state border, ensure smooth crossing of border at border control points, ensure high quality of the border control and harmonise entirely the activities of the border guard with the EU requirements. It is also the task of the border guard to fend off the new security risks like illegal migration, organised crime, terrorism, trade in narcotics, illegal weapons trade etc. The tasks of the border guard include search and rescue operations at sea and liquidation of pollution at sea as well as coordination of air accidents.

The Rescue Board and its divisions in counties are also organised under the Ministry of the Interior. Storms, floods, and extensive forest fires are the main natural disasters threatening the Baltic Sea area. The main risks generated by human activity are transport, chemical and radiation catastrophes, major fires, accidents in mines and on mass events; and industrial emergencies with border-crossing impact. It is the responsibility of the state to develop and guarantee the organisation of fire fighting and rescue operations through rescue institutions. During the state of emergency declared as a result of natural disaster or catastrophe, crisis management will be organised through crisis committees and guaranteed through the alarm centres.<sup>4</sup>

The Police are also subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. The first legal basis for creating the Estonian police was laid already during the crumbling phase of the Soviet regime, when the act regulating police activity was passed September 20, 1990 ("Police Force Act"). The main role of the police was to remain the protection of the state, rather than its citizens, and this was to be done as earlier primarily through repressive measures. It soon became obvious that the aforementioned law was a hindrance to the development of the new police system. This law remained in effect until May 14, 1998, when a new "Police Service Act" was passed. The passing to this Act was a very

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<sup>3</sup> Ministry of the Interior website

<sup>4</sup> The Rescue Board website

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important step in the development of the Estonian police, since it laid the basis for stabilizing the personnel of the police force. The Act specified how personnel are to be recruited, their working conditions, benefits, ranks, and the regulations concerned with leaving the police force. Foreign experts have all along tried to help develop the Estonian police force. The police have also received essential international economical aid and training assistance.<sup>5</sup>

The Estonian police structure consists of two larger independent branches: The State Police Department and The Security Police Department. The State Police is responsible for public order and internal security, for crime prevention and crime detection, and for carrying out pre-trial criminal investigations. The Security Police is responsible for maintaining the state's constitutional and territorial integrity, for protecting state secrets, for conducting counter-intelligence, for fighting against terrorism and corruption.

In re-independent Estonia, the police officer is under-paid and lacks prestige. The police force's big competitors are private security firms, offering attractive alternatives primarily for lower ranking police officers. Many of Estonia's present police officers are former members of the Soviet "militia" or other law enforcement agencies, and therefore received their training during the Soviet era in a manner appropriate to that society.

There is an ongoing project in the Ministry of the Interior to join together the Police Board, the Board of Border guards and the Citizenship and Migration Board by the year 2010.

**The Ministry of Defence** is responsible for the role defence plays in ensuring security. In building up its national defence, Estonia is guided by its security policy goals. The task of a national defence is to guarantee readiness to ward off possible military threats and to defend Estonia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. For this purpose, Estonia has created an independent defence capability and conducts international cooperation. These measures must create sufficient deterrence and containment to avert aggression. Estonia supports and shares the goals of NATO's Strategic Concept. The basis of national defence, including the development of the defence forces, is interoperability with NATO and the forces of NATO member states as well as with the EU within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. Estonia's direct obligation in the international security system is to build up an autonomous national defence capability. As Estonia has become integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, its national defence will become a part of a collective defence organisation, as per relevant agreements.

Since the restoration of independence, a wide debate has been conducted on the necessity of creating the country's own national army, and the size of such an army. Not very surprisingly, views on this matter have diverged widely. At the one extreme there have been the social democrats and representatives of some rural parties who have preferred small, highly professional units of border guards, national defence forces and a rescue service. At the other extreme, there have been the liberal democrats who have been advocating the clearest but most controversial alternative: Estonia should have a high-technology, highly trained professional army, but all men (and those women who wish it) must receive military training. Other political factions have argued for options lying between these extremes.

The foundation of Estonia's national defence is total defence that embraces the entire society. In integrating with international structures, total defence also supports collective defence. The state must ensure that all structures are prepared to combat danger, including by providing the armed forces, the Defence League and other militarily organised agencies and reservists with up-to-date training so as to assure their continued readiness to defend the state. The state must also provide for the rational use of all resources.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Estonian Police Board website

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Defence website

**The Ministry for Foreign Affairs** concentrates on foreign policy, trade policy and development policy as well as on significant foreign policy issues and international relations in general.<sup>7</sup>

**The Estonian Neighbourhood Watch (ENHW)** has had its roots in peoples' fear of crime and their desire to protect themselves. The ENHW is a civic initiative with the goal of increasing the sense of security of people in their homes and in close vicinity to homes. It was citizens' reaction towards the dramatic cut in the number of police officers in 2000 that started the ENHW. In Estonia there are 365 neighbourhood watch sectors and 9862 members (10.12 2007). During the seven years the organisation has found a place in Estonian society. The central success factor of NHW is cooperation and exchange of information between house/apartment owners, local government and the police.<sup>8</sup>

## 2.2 Strategies and doctrines

Estonia has two strategies that deal with security:

- 1) Draft Main guidelines of Estonia's Security Policy Until 2015
- 2) National security concept of the Republic of Estonia

The two strategies and doctrines on security can be divided into one that focuses on the individual (the Guidelines for Security Policy) and one that focuses on the national, territorial security of the nation (the National Security Concept). The Guidelines of Estonia's Security Policy Until 2015 is a draft due to the fact that this document has not yet been adopted by the Parliament.

A program on Internal security is being developed in Estonia in cooperation with the third sector, the private sector and different ministries. This program will shortly be introduced to all parliamentary groups and then hopefully adopted in the end of the year 2008.

1) The draft 'Main guidelines of Estonia's Security Policy Until 2015' (hereinafter the main guidelines of the security policy), establishes the standard principles and long-term effect-based objectives of the security policy – principles which must be adhered to. The main guidelines of the security policy are based on the principles according to which prevention and combating of threats and extensive involvement of citizens in the process is far more effective measure for ensuring internal stability in Estonia and saving and protecting human lives than measures of penal power. The central principles of security policy are individual responsibility, involvement, co-operation, prevention and long-term planning.

The vision of the security policy is that Estonia in the year 2015 is a secure society, manifested by a safe living environment and an increase in personal safety as well as a decrease in fatalities and injuries. The security of all members of the society has been ensured through co-operation between the public sector and the non-profit sector – a partnership which functions on both the national and local level, and is focused on threat prevention. At the same time, a clear improvement can be seen in people's ability to take the right course of action in hazardous situations, and help themselves or other individuals in case of trouble.

The objectives of the guidelines are centred on the individual (crime against persons, fire, traffic accidents, property protection, accidents etc) and the implementation and attainment of the objectives is supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. The ministries must involve as many local governments, companies, social and other organisations and volunteers in implementation of the main guidelines. Once a year the Government of the Republic, represented by the Minister of the

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<sup>7</sup> Estonian Ministry for Foreign Affairs website

<sup>8</sup> Estonian Neighbourhood Watch website

Interior and the Minister of Justice, must give a presentation to the Parliament (Riigikogu) on implementation of the guidelines and the state of law enforcement affairs in the country.<sup>9</sup>

2) The National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2004) has been drawn up by the Government. It presents the goal and guidelines of Estonia's National Security Policy and a general evaluation of the existing security environment. The goal of the Estonian National Security Policy is to preserve Estonia's independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, and public safety. The Security Concept identifies threats to national security (threats to national security, threat of a military conflict, threat of external coercion, threat of international terrorism, threat deriving from organised crime, threats deriving from human activity and natural disasters, threats of a social origin, threats of an economic origin and threats in the information technology sphere) The Security Concept goes on to identify the organisational responses to these threats (NATO is a central feature of Estonia's foreign policy). Estonia reacts differently to a threat as a member of NATO (i.e. collectively) than for example a non-NATO country like Finland. Estonia may perceive the same threats as Finland but reacts to them differently.<sup>10</sup>

### **2.3 Private Sector**

As Estonia is a small country, the security technology sector is consequently small. As an area of business, the security sector mainly includes companies that provide security products and services. Cybernetica is the main research and development company providing security technology in Estonia. There are some smaller companies such as Englo and E-Arsenal that provide equipment for the Ministry of Defence. Cybernetica's main customer is the government, to which they provide e-Police programs, e-voting programs, eCustoms, e-health (information systems for laboratories in hospitals), surveillance systems, information security management, communication systems and electronic document management. Security services in Estonia are usually bought from the outside. Cybernetica's interest concerning security research centers on information security. There are also some large companies that are users of Cybernetica's technology solutions. The Estonian energy company (Eesti energia) needs security technologies to protect themselves and is thus a considerable customer/user of security technology.<sup>11</sup>

### **2.4 Key technologies**

The central company for security technology in Estonia is Cybernetica and their central sectors/key technologies are; information systems and security solutions such as the e-Customs, different Information Security Systems, Visual Light Navigation and Telematics Systems as well as Surveillance and Communication systems.

### **2.5 Current Research programs and Research projects**

Security research is carried out mainly at the Universities and research institutes in Tallinn. The integration of Estonia into NATO and the EU, and the issues it raises, is strongly present in the field of security research.

Issues related to security are being researched at the International Centre for Defence Studies (ICDS) in Tallinn. The research project on Security Sector Reform is focused on the transformation of the security system in order to bring it into conformity with democratic principles and norms. The security system comprises all the security institutions together with their tasks, areas of responsibility and activities. The research project will involve the analysis of experiences

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<sup>9</sup> Draft Main guidelines of Estonia's Security Policy Until 2015, p.1

<sup>10</sup> National Security Concept (2004)

<sup>11</sup> Cybernetica – Company profile, p. 2

connected with Estonian security sector reform, lessons learned when the reform was implemented and Estonia's role in sharing these experiences with transition democracies.<sup>12</sup>

The institute also has a security related Sociological research program with the aim of providing information to the respective national agencies about public opinion regarding Estonian security and foreign policy objectives and implementation of the respective policies as well as to promoting social debates about these issues, thereby shaping public attitudes. The project is based on the results of public opinion monitoring conducted three times a year since 2000 at the request of the Ministry of Defence, specific topical surveys, focus group interviews and polls on domestic stability, possible conflict issues and security risks. The project will involve the compilation of analytical research reports and memos on individual issues, public presentations of research results, discussion seminars for specialists, officials and politicians, and publication of articles in the media.

The Security in the Baltic Sea Region research programme (ICDS) focuses on the changed security situation in the Baltic Sea area after the admission of the Baltic States and Poland into both the EU and NATO, leaving the two organisations face to face with Russia. Multiple reforms have been carried through in the new member states and their security and defence institutions have been modernised to EU and NATO standards. However, due to scarce resources, the new small states tend to make pragmatic choices in their security co-operation formats. While the old members in the region tend to prioritise the deepening of the ESDP co-operation format, the new members are keener to co-operate with NATO. This has sometimes resulted in a deep regional split of interests. The purpose of this research program is to follow the integration process of the new members into the EU and NATO and assess how the integration process has influenced regional Baltic Sea security co-operation.<sup>13</sup>

Cybernetica conducts security research and development activities. Cybernetica's research and development activities are an inseparable part of the company's main business. Cybernetica has participated in several international projects and programs:

- HiTS/ISAC (Highway to Security. Interoperability for Situation awareness and Crisis Management) – secure interoperability of intelligence services for prevention of terrorism and organized crime (Preparatory action for EU FP7)
- BALTICTIME – development of legal and accountable digital time stamping systems (Latvia-Lithuania-Estonia-Italy-Poland-Ireland)
- RESET – Roadmaps for European research on Smart card Technologies.<sup>14</sup>

From 2003 onwards, Cybernetica participates in the Competence Centre Programme financed by Enterprise Estonia, aimed to support the cooperation between research institutions and companies' market-targeted research and development activities.<sup>15</sup>

### 3. Public Opinion

There are a couple of public opinion polls conducted in Estonia. The results of the opinion polls reflect the changes and events that have taken place in Estonia and in the world during the last 10 years. The unrest related to the Bronze Soldier can clearly be detected in the opinion polls from 2007, especially concerning security issues.

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<sup>12</sup> ICDS website

<sup>13</sup> ICDS website

<sup>14</sup> Cybernetica – Company Profile, p.6

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

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The opinion poll conducted by the Ministry of Defence indicates that the residents of Estonia consider the most reliable institutions to be the Bank of Estonia, the Border Guard, the Defence Forces and the Tax and Customs Board, which more than three thirds of the population completely or mostly trust. The unrest related to the Bronze Soldier which took place in Tallinn at the end of April has significantly increased the differences between Estonians and non-Estonians regarding trust in state institutions. The Defence Forces are considered reliable by 89% of Estonians but by 60% of non-Estonians.<sup>16</sup>

The global situation is still considered to be unstable – the increase of military conflict in the world within the next decade is considered likely by 47% of the respondents. 15% of the respondents estimate that the world will become a safer place. This poll writes that the most probable threat to Estonia is considered to be extensive environmental pollution. In connection to this, a possible military attack by another country is considered to be one of the most unlikely threats (12% of the respondents). Among the most important factors ensuring Estonia's security, Estonia's membership in NATO is mentioned most frequently. This is followed by membership of the European Union and good-neighbourly relations with Russia. Compared to the previous wave of polls, the significance of the EU as a security guarantee has substantially increased, the reason for which could be the EU's reaction towards Russia in relation to the unrest which took place in Tallinn at the end of April 2007. 53% of the respondents find that Estonia's security has increased since its accession to NATO, while 34% believe that no changes have taken place. The proportion of residents who believe that accession to NATO had a positive effect on Estonia's security has increased during the last few years.<sup>17</sup>

According to the public survey conducted by Turu-uuringute AS in December 2007, the trust of inhabitants in Estonian police grew up to 80 per cent, which is the best result of all time.<sup>18</sup>

The current EUROBAROMETER 68 poll provides a summary of the issues which Estonian citizens perceive as the most important and that require solutions in the near future. The interesting fact in this poll is the high interest in defence and foreign policy (7%, fall 2007) compared to the EU 27 average (2%). This percentage was even higher when asked in the spring of 2007 (14%), after the unrest related to the Bronze soldier. At that time, spring 2007, terrorism was also perceived as an issue by 3% of the citizens while it had gone down to 1% in the fall of 2007. Rise in price levels and inflation was the most frequently mentioned issue (58%). Criminality is perceived as an issue by 44% of the Estonian citizens, which is above the average of the EU 27 (24%).<sup>19</sup>

Estonian Neighbourhood Watch (ENHW) has commissioned University of Tartu to conduct a survey in 2006 on the ENHW as an effective model for reducing fear of crime and preventing crimes. 67% of the respondents said that their home has become safer after starting with ENHW. 72% believe that the possible help is now closer than before becoming a member of ENHW. 18% of respondents know that in their sector there has been a prevented crime and 10% know a case where the action of ENHW has helped to catch a criminal. This data is a very promising result considering how rarely people actually witness a crime. This data is also valuable as it is unique: the police are only recording the committed crimes, not the prevented ones. To sum up, the survey shows that ENHW helps to prevent crime and reduce the fear of crime. The members of ENHW know that the necessary help is close and if there is a need they can co-operate with their neighbours.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Public opinion and National defence, p.2

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p.3

<sup>18</sup> [http://www.politsei.ee/?mid=5&mcid=11379&ctype=news\\_article&pageid=1094](http://www.politsei.ee/?mid=5&mcid=11379&ctype=news_article&pageid=1094)

<sup>19</sup> Eurobarometer 68, p.27

<sup>20</sup> ENHW website [http://www.naabrivalve.ee/index.php?lang=eng&main\\_id=192](http://www.naabrivalve.ee/index.php?lang=eng&main_id=192)

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## **4. Current foresight activities**

### **4.1 National foresight activities**

There are no security foresight activities conducted on national level but the area of security threats to Estonia are dealt with in the National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2004) which has been drawn up by the Government. It presents the goal and guidelines of Estonia's National Security Policy and a general evaluation of the existing security environment. The Security concept will be revised according to changes in the security environment, and as new options develop for ensuring and enhancing Estonia's security. The Security Concept identifies 9 threats to Estonian national security.<sup>21</sup>

1. Uncontrollable developments in the world and international crises
2. Threat of a military conflict
3. Threat of external coercion
4. Threat of international terrorism
5. Threat deriving from organised crime
6. Threats deriving from human activity and natural disasters
7. Threats of a social origin
8. Threats of an economic origin
9. Threats in the information technology sphere

### **4.2 International foresight activities**

Estonian organisations have not participated in international security foresight activities before but the interest for this in various organisations was indicated.

### **4.3 Identified threats**

A common understanding concerning the security threats to Estonia could be recognized during the interviews of the expert Estonian stakeholders. Social exclusion and marginalisation as well as the threat of increased societal insecurity were particularly identified as threats by stakeholders from the Government and NGO sector. The changed security environment and threat assessment are mainly due to Estonia's membership in NATO but it cannot be ruled out that as a NATO ally, Estonia could become the target of a terrorist attack. Cyber-attacks were mentioned by nearly all stakeholders as a real threat. The network services of the Estonian government were paralysed during the statue dispute in April 2007 and this attack is in fresh memory. Attacks against property are perceived as a threat, especially as the Estonian middle-class is growing and the income gap between Estonians is widening. Weakening of border security was mentioned but on the whole Estonians trust the capability of the Border Guard and do not see border security as a direct threat. The increase of violence in society and the weakening of everyday security were perceived by all interviewed stakeholders as a considerable threat to security in Estonia. In conjunction with this threat organised crime was frequently mentioned. The threat of Russia was formulated mostly as a need to follow the political developments in Russia and to monitor Russia's ability to address organised crime and drug trafficking which has a clear spill-over effect for Estonia.

Please find further information on the identified threats in Table 6 in the Appendix.

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<sup>21</sup> National Security Concept (2004)

## 5. European collaboration

The majority of the Estonian experts interviewed stressed the importance of European cooperation for a small country such as Estonia. The majority of the trends and threats are such that they require multilateral responses.

The responses, activities and research priorities, identified by the interviewed stakeholders, that are relevant also at the European level, and would benefit from European-wide collaboration are:

### Actions/responses

- Border security
  - It is important for Estonia's border security to cooperate with border guard authorities in other European countries. The Border Guard is constantly in touch with the relevant authorities of EU member states, Schengen countries and countries applying for EU membership. The employees of the Border Guard also participate in EU civilian crisis management operations. Collaboration is already taking place in the form of FRONTEX and similar actions would be welcomed. Development of different border technologies is welcomed.
- Standardised risk management
- Efforts against organised crime – more tools, strategies and mechanisms within the EU to act.
- New technologies would benefit from European wide research
- Emergency communication – the relationship between technology and society in emergency situations could be researched at European level and cross-border emergency scenarios and projects would be beneficial.
- The European Defence Agency (EDA) is very relevant for capability development and is an important European collaboration method.
- Coordinated efforts of fighting International terrorism
- Coordinated efforts in environmental protection/policies
- Critical infrastructure protection – preventing or mitigating Europe-wide cyber attacks

### Research

- Technology research on reducing the vulnerability of information systems and electronic networks and critical infrastructure.
- Research on strategic threats
- Russia and its interest for the neighbouring countries (for the so called Post-Soviet space)

## 6. Conclusions

The Estonian concept of security has been dominated by the accession strategy to NATO and EU ever since the independence in 1991. The concepts and definitions surrounding security and its different dimensions such as state, societal and human security are relatively new to Estonians and Estonia is only starting to develop its internal security strategy. The newly independent Estonia has had a tremendous task of creating a new political environment and at the same time constructing a whole new economic and legislative environment. On top of this, societal security threats in the form of transnational crime and narcotics smuggling have caused significant societal

problems in Estonia. Societal security has been defined by the interviewed experts as society's well being, ranging from individual's economic and social wellbeing to collective societal trust in the political order and the state's capacity to provide personal and financial security to its general public. Societal security is a relatively unknown term in Estonia and security is more often perceived as containing military components.

Cooperation at Ministry level is somewhat hindered by ministries being fairly independent from each other. The NATO/EU agenda has been strong since 1994 and this has influenced the ministerial cooperation. Cooperation between ministries has in the 10 years since independence been structured so that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been focused on attaining membership in EU and the Ministry of Defence has concentrated on Estonia's NATO membership. Several stakeholders commented on the fact that some MoD officials are better acquainted with their NATO counterparts than with their Estonian colleagues in other ministries. Strategies concerning internal security and citizen security are under development and the situation regarding the strategies and the field of organisations related to security might change in the next 10 years.

Cooperation at grassroots level, between first responders is functioning well. This was witnessed during the April 2007 riots (the statue conflict) during which the first responders worked and communicated well with each other. The lesson learnt, according to the stakeholders interviewed, was that the Ministry of Defence is not flexible enough to act instantly in such a situation. A number of stakeholders indicated that the government needs to revise its reaction in situations of crisis.

There is some research conducted in Estonia on societal issues related to security but the majority of research is on the role of accession to NATO and EU for Estonia.

A common understanding concerning the security threats to Estonia could be recognized during the interviews of the expert Estonian stakeholders. Social exclusion and marginalisation as well as the threat of increased societal insecurity were particularly identified as threats by stakeholders from the Government and NGO sector. The changed security environment and threat assessment are mainly due to Estonia's membership in NATO but it cannot be ruled out that as a NATO ally, Estonia could become the target of a terrorist attack. Cyber-attacks were mentioned by nearly all stakeholders as a real threat. The network services of the Estonian government were paralysed during the statue dispute in April 2007 and this attack is in fresh memory. Attacks against property are perceived as a threat, especially as the Estonian middle-class is growing and the income gap between Estonians is widening. Weakening of border security was mentioned but on the whole Estonians trust the capability of the Border Guard and do not see border security as a direct threat. The increase of violence in society and the weakening of everyday security were perceived by all interviewed stakeholders as a considerable threat to security in Estonia. In conjunction with this threat organised crime was frequently mentioned. The threat of Russia was formulated mostly as a need to follow the political developments in Russia and to monitor Russia's ability to address organised crime and drug trafficking which has a clear spill-over effect for Estonia.

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The Rescue Board

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## Appendix A Current security related activities

**Table 1 Organizations**

Organisation	Short Description	Mission	Collaboration	Contact Information
Ministry of Defence	The Ministry of Defence is a government agency that performs the duties in the area of government of the Ministry that are pursuant to laws and follows the guidelines given by the Government of the Republic	i) working out proposals for planning of the defence policy and implementing the plans; ii) working out the general plan for national defence; arranging preparation and implementation of mobilisation, arranging the subsequent record management and training of reservists; iii) arranging, financing and supervising the activities of the Defence Forces and the Defence League; iv) developing the defence industry; v) drafting subsequent legislation.	At present, Estonia participates in international operations in co-operation with NATO, the UN, and the European Union and its allies.	Sakala 1, 15094 Tallinn info@kmin.ee Tel: +372 7170022 <a href="http://www.mod.gov.ee/?setlang=eng">http://www.mod.gov.ee/?setlang=eng</a>
The Ministry of the Interior	The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for ensuring the internal security of the state, protecting the public order, guarding the state borders and enforcing the border regime, organising crisis management, supervising the rescue services and ensuring readiness for emergencies. The Ministry's area of responsibility also includes dealing with citizenship and migration issues, issues related to data protection and population affairs, planning and co-ordination of local government, regional administration and regional development policies, and co-ordination of spatial planning activities.	In the field of internal security the Ministry of the Interior and the institutions in its governing area have a mission to assure the internal security of the state and to protect the public order, to guard and protect the state border and assure the border regime.	The Ministry of the Interior co-ordinates co-operation with other ministries in issues related to state security	Pikk 61, 15065 Tallinn Estonia tel: 612 5008, fax: 612 5010, <a href="mailto:info@siseminist.eerium.ee">info@siseminist.eerium.ee</a>
Rescue Services	The Estonian Rescue Board is an autonomous governmental institution within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.	The Rescue Board is responsible for inland fire and rescue services in Estonia. In general, operational services are organised at county level and the Rescue Board has administrative duties, but there are also some operational units directly under The Rescue Board's control.	The Rescue Board has established fruitful co-operative relations with the following voluntary organisations:i) Estonian Association of Fire and Rescue ChiefsDefence League,ii) Estonian Life Saving Association, iii) Estonian Red Cross	Estonian Rescue Board Raua street 2 10124 TALLINN Tel: +372 628 2000 <a href="http://www.rescue.ee/index.php?page=114">http://www.rescue.ee/index.php?page=114</a>

Police	The Estonian police structure consists of two larger independent branches: The State Police Department and The Security Police Department. The State Police is responsible for public order and internal security, for crime prevention and crime detection, and for carrying out pre-trial criminal investigations. The Security Police is responsible for maintaining the state's constitutional and territorial integrity, for protecting state secrets, for conducting counter-intelligence, for fighting against terrorism and corruption.	Estonian Police identifies the areas directed at the community as the priority areas. The Police aims at promoting constable work in order to be accessible to the people; patrolling in order to be seen, and traffic supervision in order to protect people from traffic hooligans. Fight against drug users and prevent crimes against person, continue to be the areas most closely scrutinized by the Estonian Police.	International co operation in various law enforcemnt areas is very important for the Estonian police. All international communication channels are under one roof in Central Criminal Police. Central partners are INTERPOL and EUROPOL	Eesti Politsei Pärnu mnt 139, Tallinn 15060 tel.612 3000, <a href="mailto:politseiamet@politsei.ee">politseiamet@politsei.ee</a> <a href="http://www.politse.ee/?lang=en">http://www.politse.ee/?lang=en</a>
Border guard	The Border Guard is a national armed organisation which, at peacetime, is included in the area of administration of the Ministry of the Interior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Passport Control</li> <li>• Surveillance and Investigation</li> <li>• Search and Rescue Operations</li> <li>• Locating and Eliminating Pollution at Sea</li> <li>• Air Rescue</li> <li>• Performing Customs Duties</li> <li>• National Defense Duties</li> </ul>	Border Guard in Finland, FRONTEX (EU)	<a href="http://www.pv.ee/index.php?page=158">http://www.pv.ee/index.php?page=158</a>
Estonian Neighbourhood Watch (ENHW)	The ENHW is a civic initiative with the goal of increasing the sense of security of people in their homes and in close vicinity to homes.	The central success factor of NHW is cooperation and exchange of information between house/apartment owners, local government and the police.	The Estonian Police	<a href="http://www.naabrivalt.ee">www.naabrivalt.ee</a>

**Table 2: Strategies and doctrines**

Document	Short Description	Objectives	Contact Information
Draft Main guidelines of Estonia's Security Policy Until 2015 (2008)	The draft 'Main guidelines of Estonia's Security Policy Until 2015' (hereinafter the main guidelines of the security policy), establishes the standard principles and long-term effect-based objectives of the security policy – principles which must be adhered to.	The objectives of the guidelines are centred on the individual (crime against persons, fire, traffic accidents, property protection, accidents etc) and the implementation and attainment of the objectives is supervised by the Ministry of the Interior.	Ministry of Defence <a href="http://www.mod.gov.ee/?setlang=eng">http://www.mod.gov.ee/?setlang=eng</a>
National Security Concept (2004)	The National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2004) has been drawn up by the Government. It presents the goal and guidelines of Estonia's National Security Policy and a general evaluation of the existing security environment.	The goal of the Estonian National Security Policy is to preserve Estonia's independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, and public safety.	The Government of Estonia

**Table 3: Private sector**

Name	Short Description	Main activities	Contact information
Cybernetica	Cybernetica is a private research and development company active in the field of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT). Cybernetica offers a wide range of original data security, visual navigation, light signalling and telematics products.	Cybernetica's main customer is the government, to which they provide e-Police programs, e-voting programs, eCustoms, e-health (information systems for laboratories in hospitals), surveillance systems, information security management, communication systems and electronic document management.	Akademia tee 21 Tel: +372 639 7991 <a href="http://www.cyber.ee">www.cyber.ee</a>
Englo	Englo designs and manufactures mechanical and electronic devices.	Englo's products include metal detectors, radiation detectors, blasting devices and line testers as well as distance and length measuring devices.	Akademina tee 21 Tel: + 372 670 2444 <a href="http://www.englo.eu">www.englo.eu</a>
E-Arsenal	E-Arsenal sells services and products for the defence forces.	Their main activities include repairs, development and conservation of arms, production and sales of pyrotechnic products. The company also produces and sells training aids used in the defence forces.	Erika 4, Tallinn Tel. +372 667 9402 <a href="http://www.e-arsenal.ee">www.e-arsenal.ee</a>

**Table 4 Key Technologies**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Short Description</b>	<b>Impacts</b>
Information Security Systems	Solutions for secure use of intra-company network applications externally and for secure arrangements of data exchange between companies. Also firewall software in different forms.	Increasingly secure information society
Surveillance and Communication systems	Vessel traffic monitoring and reporting system for the Baltic Sea countries	Increased safety of vessel traffic and protection of the marine ecosystem of the Gulf of Finland including automated information exchange between the ships.

**Table 5 Current Research programs**

Name	Short Description	Main activities	Contact information
Sociological research (ICDS)	The Sociological research program has the aim of providing information to the respective national agencies about public opinion regarding Estonian security and foreign policy objectives and implementation of the respective policies as well as to promoting social debates about these issues, thereby shaping public attitudes. The project is based on the results of public opinion monitoring conducted three times a year since 2000 at the request of the Ministry of Defence, specific topical surveys, focus group interviews and polls on domestic stability, possible conflict issues and security risks.	The project will involve the compilation of analytical research reports and memos on individual issues, public presentations of research results, discussion seminars for specialists, officials and politicians, and publication of articles in the media.	Juhan Kivirähk ICDS Toom-Rüütli 12 - 6, Tallinn 10130 <a href="mailto:juhan@icds.ee">juhan@icds.ee</a> <a href="http://www.icds.ee">www.icds.ee</a>
Security in the Baltic Sea Region (ICDS)	The Security in the Baltic Sea Region research programme focuses on the changed security situation in the Baltic Sea area after the admission of the Baltic states and Poland into both the EU and NATO, leaving the two organisations face to face with Russia.	The purpose of this research program is to follow the integration process of the new members into the EU and NATO and assess how the integration process has influenced regional Baltic Sea security co-operation.	Riina Kaljurand ICDS Toom-Rüütli 12 - 6, Tallinn 10130 <a href="mailto:riina@icds.ee">riina@icds.ee</a>
Security Sector Reform (ICDS)	Security sector reform is the transformation of the security system in order to bring it into conformity with democratic principles and norms. The security system comprises all the security institutions together with their tasks, areas of responsibility and activities.	The research project will involve the analysis of experiences connected with Estonian security sector reform, lessons learned when the reform was implemented and Estonia's role in sharing these experiences with transition democracies.	Riina Kaljurand ICDS Toom-Rüütli 12 - 6, Tallinn 10130 <a href="mailto:riina@icds.ee">riina@icds.ee</a>
HiTS/ISAC (Cybernetica)	The vision of HiTS/ISAC is a more secure Europe through prevention of terrorism and organized crime through the ssecure interoperability of intelligence services.	The objective of HiTS/ISAC is to enable information analysis and fusion from many different sources, through secure cross-border on-line group cooperation between authorities. The aim is to detect and provide early warnings for suspicious activities, be it communication between suspected criminals, or anomalous movement of persons, goods or money, etc.	Mrs. Monika Oit Research Director <a href="mailto:monika.oit@cyber.ee">monika.oit@cyber.ee</a>

## Appendix B Identified threats

**Table 6 Threats identified by the expert Estonian stakeholders**

Name	Short Description
Societal insecurity / radicalisation	The income gap has increased in Estonia during the last 10 years. Social security is not at the same level in Estonia as it is in many other European countries and thus citizens cannot trust that the society will provide for them in case of illness or unemployment. The marginalisation of the groups of people not able to provide for themselves has become a serious problem and radicalisation of these groups in society is a threat.
Changed security policy environment	Estonia's security policy environment and threat assessment have changed mainly because of its membership in NATO and in the European Union and because developments in the global security environment. Threats requiring the response of Estonia's defence institutions have become much more diverse in the last decade. New, complex and often unpredictable military and non-military security risks are more likely to arise, posing new challenges to the maintenance of security. As a NATO member state, Estonia's responsibilities in strengthening international security and in removing related risks have notably increased. It cannot be ruled out that, as a NATO Ally, Estonia could become the target of a terrorist attack aimed at the organisation or its members.
Cyber-attacks	As the so-called statue dispute broke in Tallinn in late April 2007, the network services of the Estonian government were paralysed by denial-of-service of progressively growing traffic volume. In addition, attacks were made at least against payment transfer systems and news services. The attacks were active for several weeks. The cyber attacks grabbed the attention of the world's defence strategists, pushing cyber security up to the top of the global political agenda. The opinion of the interviewed stakeholders was that such attacks will most likely happen in the future as well. Even before the attacks Estonia had been developing NATO's Centre of Excellence in Cooperative Cyber Defence, which purpose is to strengthen the alliance's cyber defence capabilities. The Centre commissions research, especially on new tools for protection and prevention of attacks.
Attacks against property	The 'middle-class' of Estonia is getting increasingly wealthy and are acquiring larger properties. For the larger and more expensive houses people feel that they need to buy private security services to protect their property. This indicates that they do not feel that the security that the police are able to provide is sufficient. Neighbourhood Watch in Estonia has noted the same phenomenon. Neighbourhood Watch nevertheless were of the view that the 'real' threat to peoples' property is not as high as the private security companies would like to make people believe. In this issue the perception of security might be stronger than the actual situation.
Major accidents and natural disasters	There is a marked increased in maritime traffic both vertically and horizontally in the Gulf of Finland. Many Russian ships do not fill the required regulations and in case of even a minor crash with another vessel, they may leak oil into the sea. A nuclear accident in the near environs of Estonia such as at the Russian Nuclear power plant Sosnovy Bor, which is situated only a few hundred kilometres from the Estonian border, may have serious repercussions. Serious accidents involving hazardous substances are a threat. Storms, floods or dam failures requiring evacuation or causing extensive destruction are concrete threats.
Borders and the lack of borders	Migratory flows in all shapes are a major compromise to border security. As Estonia is a small country the border is only a few hundred kilometres long. The residents of Estonia consider the Border Guard to the one of the most reliable institutions in the country.
Threats of a social origin	The growing drug addiction, alcoholism, and the spread of HIV/AIDS, along with other dangerous contagious diseases, pose a threat to Estonia's economic welfare as well as the nation's social and political stability.
Weakening of everyday security	The increase of violence in society worried most interviewed stakeholders. The police resources (both human and financial) are limited. This has lead to an increase in hiring private security companies and investing in expensive security technology equipment for the home, especially in the growing middle class. These measures will nevertheless be out of reach for the majority of the Finnish citizens and will further the sense of inequality in society.
Securing the energy supply	A major threat factor is the great dependence of Estonia's gas and electrical systems upon foreign monopolistic energy systems and suppliers. It is know that the energy supply will be an issue in the future and thus many interviewed stakeholders mentioned this as a possible threat.
Organised crime/ International criminality	Organised crime is a key security threat in Estonia. Organised crime groups are skilful at the concealment and disguise needed to avoid contact with law enforcement. It is thus very difficult to penetrate and precisely determine organised crime mechanisms and patterns. The pragmatic and transnational nature of organised crime groups underscores the necessity of a comprehensive regional cooperation strategy in the Baltic region. Since the collapse of the authoritarian Soviet regime the controlled environment to which organised crime groups were contained has become a lucrative area for various new and old criminal groups. The regulatory vacuum was filled with organised crime and corruption. The newly independent Estonia had a tremendous task of creating a new political environment and at the same time constructing a whole new economic environment. On top of this, societal security threats in the form of transnational crime and narcotics smuggling has caused significant societal problems in Estonia. The Estonian law enforcement cooperation with Finland has been helpful in institutional learning and in developing legal and operational capacities in Estonia's counter-narcotics efforts.

Terrorism	As a NATO member, Estonia is susceptible to terrorist attacks in principle, but in reality such an attack is not highly likely.
Disturbance in the functioning of the economy	Estonia's economy is, to a great extent, integrated with the world economy. The problems in a globalised world know no boundaries and Estonia will feel the effects in its economy of the US, India, China and Russia's ability to deal with their problems at hand. A malfunction in international and domestic payment systems and a significant disruption in the financial market will affect Estonia. As consequences of this disruption in foreign trade and disruptions of sea transports as well as fuel imports are also considered threats. Estonia is relying on foreign imports and a serious disturbance in the supply of daily consumer goods from abroad has been mentioned in the interviews.
Russia and its development	The political development of Russia requires attention. The new EU members of the Baltic region are Europe's frontier to the East. Russia poses an immense challenge to the EU and its new Baltic members, due to its regulatory problems, and inability to address organised crime and an increase in drug trafficking primarily from Central Asia. The current stable political situation in Estonia does not easily allow Russia to pose an overwhelmingly strong threat to its security, whether through organised crime or other measures. Cooperating with Russia in developing legal and operational capacities is of high priority. Estonia is regarded as a window of opportunity for Russian organised crime groups. The problem is, however, that the human and financial resources committed to this in Russia are lacking. The local Russian population (minority) in Estonia can be seen as a threat only when and if Russia encourages action by the minority as a policy tool (as happened in the April 2007 revolts in Tallinn). Russian planes regularly violate the Estonian airspace.