

 **FORESEC - Europe's evolving security: drivers, trends and scenarios**

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Country report on Poland**

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## Introduction

This country report on Poland represents one of the 12 country reports that have been compiled as part of the FORESEC project's State of the Art Scan on European security (see further about the project at [www.foresec.eu](http://www.foresec.eu)). The scan provides an overview of the security field in the 12 countries chosen. The countries have been selected to give a good overview of the different cultures, geographical locations, national strategies and societal challenges that face European security and shape the priorities and interest at the European level.<sup>1</sup>

Section 1 of the report discusses the concept of security in Poland, sections 2 looks at the current security related activities including organisations, strategies, role of the private sector, key technologies and current research programs and projects. Section 3 discusses the public opinion in Poland vis-à-vis security threats. Section 4 gives an overview of current foresight activities and section 5 highlights issues where European level collaboration is seen to have most added value. For most sections, further details are provided in the Appendix.

### 1. Concept of Security

It is impossible to discuss a conceptualisation of security vis-à-vis Poland without considering the countries geopolitical situation. For Poland, its geographical position between two large powers has to a large extent put an absolute boundary on foreign and security policy. During the communist years, the contacts between Poland and Russia were quite well developed. Since then, however, the two countries have open up to new influences and taken different routes to the future.

In the past, the geographical position was the source of threats to the Polish state. Hence, history, and Poland's current position as a state bordering the former Soviet Union, means that security policies remain strongly concerned with territorial defence. It is therefore no surprise that Poland applied for NATO membership as early as 1992. Joining NATO in March 1999 was one of the most significant events in contemporary Polish history. With this move Poland became part of the allied system of defence, which not only guarantees security but also creates stable conditions for development of Poland.

Except NATO, Poland has a somewhat ambivalent position towards multilateral security institutions not dissimilar to the US perspective (Zaborowski & Longhurst 2003). This was demonstrated during the NATO operation in Kosovo. Unlike e.g. Germany or France, Poland did not see a serious debate about the illegality of NATO action without a UN mandate; international law was less important than preventing the spread of instability in the Balkans (Osica 2002).

Poland's entrance into the European Union in 2004 has been called the most important event in country's history ever (Unge et al. 2008). Initially Poland took a rather sceptical position towards EU initiatives within the security field. Europeans should instead develop defence capabilities within framework of NATO. Before the EU membership, another argument was that the planned ESDP could exclude those European NATO members that remained outside the EU. Poland has now taken a more proactive position towards security cooperation within the framework of the European Union. "Today more and more people start to see the EU as an additional security provider", one stakeholder said.

The primary security provider is of course still the US. The Polish–American relations have been consistently vibrant since the end of the Cold War and since the early 1990s Poland has emerged as one of the US's closest allies and the relationship is predominantly based on strategic

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<sup>1</sup> The FORESEC state of the art scan covers Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

considerations. For Poland, the US presence in Europe provides support against its neighbours. For US, Poland is an allied at a strategic position between eastern and western Europe.

Poland's willingness to participate in US lead operations should be seen as an expression on the importance the Poles ascribe to the US-Poland link; "US is our good friend and Poland should therefore support them". The participation is hence indirectly linked to Polish interests. Stakeholders underlined that this view is shared by the public and the policy community. Poland sent soldiers to Afghanistan and to the Persian Gulf. The deployed forces - mine disposal, logistic and naval units, and units of special forces - have earned the high esteem of the other participating forces.

Recently Polish soldiers have been killed in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps this is not the only reason, but recently there have been problem for the Polish army to recruit volunteers to missions abroad. Earlier this was not a problem, as this was perceived as an attractive option by qualified people. Poland not only contributed with troops, Poland has also become one of the leading actors in the so-called "new Europe" and given the US clear support over the Iraq policy.

A hallmark of Polish security thinking is that Poland is not afraid to use armed force (or at least threaten to use it). In a recent lecture by the foreign minister of Poland Radoslaw Sikorski said: "And we are one of few countries to have done so [deployed troops] without caveats or restrictions on their operational deployment. In my previous job as a defence minister I have tried to coin a phrase, which I think is reality that *to give without caveats is to give twice*" (Sikorski 2008).

On hot topic in the Polish-American security relationship is the plan to build a missile defence system with interceptors on Polish territory. The investments have been justified by the US as a way to protect Europe and the US from future long-range ballistic missile threat from Iran. Poland was among the few European countries that since at least 2001 have unreservedly supported the US plans over a missile defence system.

While negotiations with the other country in the system - the Czech Republic - are close to be finalised, there still exist obstacles in the Poland-US way forward. While the two countries largely agree on the technical aspects of the Polish site, Poland also want to include other security related issue in the negotiations. Poland wants a bilateral defence relationship with the US that mirrors the importance the Americans attach to the missile defence system. One Polish diplomat has described the US military aid of around USD28 million per year as "peanuts" and not even enough to maintaining the Polish troops in Afghanistan (Jane's 2008). Of course, the missile defence also complicates relations with Russia. Russia is not happy at all with the American-Polish-Czech plans over a missile defence system and former president Vladimir Putin has said that Russia could withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in protest over the missile defence plans.

During the last couple of years there has been a debate over the American idea of Poland as a strategic partner and regional leader which could act as a regional security provider (Zaborowski & Longhurst 2003). It was evident that Poland, with its large population and geographical position, would become a key member in NATO. As time has evolved, the importance of Poland has increased even more. The stark contrast between Polish success in building democracy and a market economy and its regional peers, imply a special role for Poland in the region. It has been argued that the US expects Poland to play a key role in developing NATO's policy vis-à-vis Russia and states within the former Soviet Union. This is not, however, an easy task and will demand Polish initiatives and development in certain areas. One such area is the tension between Polish occupation with defence of national territory and the demand for the development of a new security paradigm customised for the post cold war era. On the more technical and organisational side, the US pushes for continued reforms of the Polish armed forces so that Poland will be ready for a broader range of deployments.

The issue of developing an eastern policy as discussed above, is of course not only an issue for NATO. This is also of great importance for the European Union. A key characteristic of the Polish eastern policy is its support for the newly independent states between itself and Russia. Poland has, for example, declares its strong support for the Ukraine in its ambitions to develop closer relations with other countries and EU. Poland considers contacts and development across borders being an effective instrument of mutual understanding to overcome “stereotypes”<sup>2</sup>. Another platform is the Central European Initiative (ISE) for cooperation in central and eastern Europe in which Poland plays an active role.

When trying to grasp the concept of security in a Polish context it is vital to include border control. Since 1989, the perception of what this is has gone through a radical change. The combination of the geographical position and the fact that Poland now belongs to the Schengen region make Poland a prime location for the trafficking of illegal immigrants, organised crime, arms and drugs. The development of appropriate measures to meet these challenges is therefore a priority for the Polish security establishment. In these efforts, Poland receives assistance from other EU members.

Another theme influencing the conceptualisation of security in Poland is energy security. Energy security can be defined so that issues related to strategic, political, military, foreign policy and the economic field are included (Larsson 2007a, p. 21). Hence, it includes both security of supply issues as well as political and security issues related to e.g. trade policy.<sup>3</sup> The use of energy as an instrument for political pressure and the growing competition for energy carriers increase risks in vicinity of Poland. On an European level, the energy situation is non-sustainable, non-competitive and dependent on imports (Larsson 2007b, p. 57). In the case of Poland, the situation is still more complicated because of its special relation to one of the main supplier of energy, namely Russia. Poland is also opting for nuclear power as a means to reduce the dependency on Russian gas.

In concluding this section, we underline that a Polish concept of security is very hard to grasp. A number of dichotomies challenge any attempt trying to conceptualise security: east meet west, the new vs. the old, the military vs. the civil aspects of security, Washington vs. Brussels etc. The Polish security landscape is indeed a complex one and any attempt to try to reach a comprehensible understanding must include a wide array of aspects of security.

## **2. Current security related activities**

### **Introduction**

The Polish state’s prevailing aim of internal security is to maintain the state’s ability to react in the event of a threat to public security. This includes the protection of life and health of citizens, legal order and national property against deliberated attacks and consequences of natural disasters and technical breakdowns.

Recently, the Polish security community has started to build a vision of a “comprehensive approach to security”. This is a response to the trend of blurring borders between internal and external aspects of security. The aim is to build a National Security System that is fully integrated, cohesive and orderly.

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<sup>2</sup> [www.poland.gov.pl](http://www.poland.gov.pl) , 2008-06-02.

<sup>3</sup> The concept energy security includes energy safety which is mainly concerned with physical safety supply (e.g. critical infrastructures).

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## 2.1 Organisations

The President of Poland, as head of state, is responsible for the security of the state. He or she is also the supreme commander of the armed forces and appoints the chief of general staff. Among the organisational units within the office of the president, the **National Security Bureau** (BBN - Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, [www.bbn.gov.pl](http://www.bbn.gov.pl)) is most relevant.

The National Security Bureau, a consultative body to the President of Poland on internal and external security of the state, is a central body within the Polish security organisation. The new National Security Strategy is issued by the National Security Bureau (BBN 2007), see further section 2.2. The BBN comprises the following units: Head of Cabinet BBN, the Department of Defence System, the Department of International Security, the Delegate for the Protection of Classified Information and the Department of Homeland Security, of which the latter is the most relevant unit in the present context.

The **Department of Homeland Security** (Departament Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) within BBN has a number of tasks related to “internal security”. The main task is to identify and define the threats to internal Polish security and to develop proposals for ways to meet them. In doing this the department must pursue a number of supporting activities. The department should collect and analyse information on the status of internal security. The threat of terrorism is particularly pointed out and the department should conduct analyses and evaluations of the threat of terrorism and evaluate the preparation of state structures to combat terrorism.

The protection of critical infrastructure (CIP) is also an area where the Department of Homeland Security plays a role. It is stated that the department should comment on ambitions in the implementation of investment in the area of critical infrastructure. The department should also initiate research and development in the field of internal security. A final task worth mentioning is that the department should investigate possible use of the armed forces in the territory of the Republic of Poland.

At the top of the security hierarchy” in the Government we find the **Ministry of Foreign Affairs** ([www.mfa.gov.pl](http://www.mfa.gov.pl)). Tasks and responsibilities in relation to security include relations with other states and international organisations, protect the interests of Poland, Polish citizens and legal entities abroad and representation in international human rights protection bodies.

The primary task of the **Ministry of National Defence** (MoND, [www.mon.gov.pl](http://www.mon.gov.pl)) is the “right to realize the President’s entitles to the supremacy over the Armed Forces during peace time.” The Minister of National Defence is the main agent of the state administration in the area of national defence. He or she is assisted by the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, the Secretary or Secretaries of State, and the Undersecretaries of State. In more general terms the ministry is responsible for national defence. This includes, among other things, development of the armed forces and deployment of the armed forces. An important task for the ministry is to fulfil the international agreements of Poland. The main priorities for the MoND is to fulfil NATO’s goals and long term requirement implementation and the professionalisation of the Polish armed forces.

From a strategic point of view **The Department of Transformation** is an important unit within MoND. Established at the beginning of 2007, the department directs the transformation of the Polish defence forces in accordance with the findings in the Strategic Defence Review. The staff of the department is composed of balanced mix of civilian and military experts to ensure the proper integration of both perspectives. Among the tasks assigned to the Department of Transformation we find contacts with Polish and international non-military institutions in the defence areas and review cooperation with military and civilian scientific institutions, in the area of analyses and simulations.

The Polish **Military Police** belongs to MoND. The tasks of the military police include protection of public security and order as well as national and business secrecy, crime detection, crime and offence prevention and other phenomena conducive to crime as well as detection of crimes and misdemeanors and pursuit of perpetrators. The MoND appreciate that one of the most significant challenges facing the military police in the future will be the necessity to undertake effective measures against organised crime. In 2004-2005, three military police specialised units were created. The main driver behind this development is the threat of terrorism. These units are also trained for handling emergencies and the aftermath of biological, radiological, or chemical attacks.

The **Ministry of Interior and Administration** (MIA, [www.mswia.gov.pl](http://www.mswia.gov.pl)) is the central node for “soft security” in Poland. A number of agencies belong to MIA, e.g. the Polish police, the state fire service, the mountain rescue service etc. Of particular importance in the present context are the National Headquarters of Border Guards and the National Civil Defence.

The goal of the **Polish Border Guard** is to protect Poland’s borders and to control cross-border traffic. This is not an easy task given the fact that Poland has one of the longest sections of the external land border of the European Union and NATO. The Polish entrance into the Schengen area in 2008 has further emphasised the importance of Polish borders. Monitoring and the control of migration (within the whole territory of Poland) of foreigners also fall within the responsibility of the Border Guard. The ministry has identified improvement of cooperation between the Border Guard and the Police and other services as a necessary step in the near future.

One example of the importance of border control in Poland is the attention that the Polish-German cooperation at the border between Frankfurt am Oder and Wick have had (Hawley 2007). This is the first international border guards cooperation centre in the new EU member states. The centre was opened by two ministers from Poland and Germany just before Poland entered the Schengen area on the 21 of December 2007.

The tasks of the **National Civil Defence** ([www.ock.gov.pl](http://www.ock.gov.pl)) are to i) protect the Polish people, companies, publicly used facilities and culture heritage, ii) provide assistance to people suffering from war and iii) combat natural disasters, environmental threats and to remove their negative consequences.

The protection of ethnic and national minorities was a key issue in Poland’s EU accession negotiations (OSI 2001). Today, the security of minorities is a prioritised policy area and there exists a **National Minorities Division** (NMD) within the Ministry of The Interior and Administration.

As mentioned above, NGO:s are supposed to play an important role in the Polish crisis management system. Since the early 90s, the Polish NGO’s have enjoyed a renaissance thanks to the reinstatement of freedom of assembly and association. Today there exist a large number of NGO:s that potentially can take on roles in the event of a national crisis, e.g. the Polish Red Cross (PCK), and the SOS Foundation.

## 2.2 Strategies and doctrines

In 2007 a new **National Security Strategy** was released (BBN 2007). The new strategy replaced the strategy adopted in 2003.

The strategy describes Poland’s national interests and strategic goals in line with the country’s constitution. The strategy is correlated with strategies of allied (NATO and EU) and implies a new approach to the issue of national security. It is stated that the EU membership has broadened the notion of the national interest and caused it to evolve. The “need to consolidate the national and European identity of Poland and its citizens in a united Europe” is explicitly mentioned and this goal

will be pursued by means of measures aimed at making citizens identify themselves more closely with the state (BBN 2007, p. 4).

The foundation of the strategy is Poland's national interests which are divided into three groups according to:

1. Vital national interests:
  - Guaranteeing the survival of the state;
  - Guaranteeing the survival of Poland's citizens;
  - Ensure that the citizens are secure;
  - Preserve state independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders;
  - Protection of human rights and fundamental freedom;
  - Consolidation of political order.
2. Important national interests
  - To guarantee that Poland develops civilizationally and economically;
  - That conditions are created for the growth of a more prosperous Polish society;
  - That conditions are created for the development of science and technology;
  - That conditions are created for a proper protection of Poland's national heritage and identity;
  - That conditions are created for proper protection of Poland's natural environment.
3. Significant national interests
  - Ensure that the Polish state maintains a strong international position and is capable of effectively promoting Polish interests abroad;
  - Strengthening the Polish ability to operate and to be effective in the most important international institutions in which Poland participates as well as the development of international relations based on respect for law and effective multilateral cooperation in line with the goals and principles laid down in the UN Charter.

To pursue the vital national interests are the absolute priority of Poland's security policy.

A number of strategic goals are derived from the national interests. The overriding goal is to provide safe conditions in which to pursue the national interests by eliminating external and internal threats and reducing risks. The other goals are easily interpreted from the national interests described above.

The strategy discusses the development of a **National Security System** composed of national security management subsystems and executive subsystems that should guarantee effective operation under any circumstances and facilitate reaction to all types of threats and crises.

Interestingly, the strategy underlines the necessity of strengthening Poland's political and economic sovereignty and consolidation of Poland's position and image as a stable, trustworthy and democratic state.

The Ministry of Interior and Administration has published a document called **Be more careful**. This cannot be considered a strategy, but more of a guide aimed at informing the public. The document contains information and a list of appropriate measures for the preparations in case of the most common dangerous events. The guide covers approximately ten different emergency situations of which the most important are: terrorism, biological and chemical threats and interruption of electricity.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The complete list is provided in the appendix.

## 2.3 Private Sector

During the communist years, the defence sector played a vital role in the whole Polish industrial landscape. Together with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, Poland was the dominating defence industry nation within the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of the cold war, the structure of the Polish defence industry has changed dramatically. The total revenue has fallen, as has exports (ca. 12 percent of production). As a natural consequence, the number of employed people in the industry has also fallen drastically, from close to 200 000 to 60 000.

The consolidation of the Polish defence industry continues and the government is heavily involved in the efforts of utilising the maximal potential of this industry sector. One key element of this reconstruction process is the privatisation of companies in the sector. The aim is to create stronger incentives for investments and modernisation of the industry. So far, however, most of the companies are still in the hands of the Polish state.

Today a group of approximately 40 companies employ the 60 000 people in the Polish defence sector. Two big holding companies dominate the scene. The **Bumar Group**, created in 2002 and owned by the state by over 90 percent, include 16 smaller companies in the fields of armored vehicles, artillery, and components. The second big group is **Industrial Development Agency**, which is more oriented towards electronics, e.g. radar systems.

The strategic importance of the defence industry is recognised in the National Security Strategy (BBN 2007). The development of the defence industry is considered being an important element of the economic sphere of Poland's security. It is further clearly stated that the state should direct investments as a means to guarantee the Polish defence industry a share in long-term defence contracts of strategic importance. The term "technological security" enters the discussion at this stage in the strategy. For Poland it is important to ensure an inflow of new technologies to the defence sector and trading in commodities and services are therefore important aspects of international contacts. A key issue here is the ambition to increase the share of the Polish defence industry in international cooperation.

The private sector is not only defence industry. Given the fact that private vendors have increased their share of operations of infrastructure, this sector is also important from a CIP (Critical Infrastructure Protection) perspective. In Poland there is an increasing awareness of the growing level of threats to infrastructure facilities and systems. Therefore the Polish state seeks to develop a national plan of protection of critical infrastructure. In the National Security Strategy it is pointed out that such a plan must also include the private sector, both as owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

## 2.4 Key technologies

Technology as a key driver for addressing the new threats is recognised by the Polish security community. It is therefore important for Poland to bridge the technological gap between Poland and some other European states in some particular areas of technology. It is however difficult to identify some "official" key technologies in relation to soft security.

Both being a member of the Schengen area and also having responsibility for one of the European Union's external borders, Poland has a natural interest in border control technologies. The use of modern technology in border control has been a trend for many years and many countries invest rather heavily in this area.

Border control technologies include a number of different technology fields. For Poland, land border control is naturally in focus and interesting fields include land surveillance (radars, electro-optical sensors and seismic sensors), detection systems (sensors for detecting humans and objects inside closed compartments), biometrics and electronic ID documents and command and control systems.

Within the field energy security Poland intends to initiate a program of development of technology related to nuclear energy. Methods and techniques for energy saving and “clean” coal are also on the agenda.

As any other modern country Poland is dependent on the functioning of information and communication systems. The Polish state has therefore identified research into information and communication technologies as one of the state’s priorities.

The national foresight programme “Poland 2020” (see further below in section 4.1) is organised into three thematic areas of which “security” is one. Under this heading the foresight project studies five areas and one of these is entitled “technical and technological security”.

## 2.5 Current Research programs and research projects

We have not been able to identify any specific research funding programme in the field of soft or civil security. The description in this section therefore focuses on current research environments where relevant research activities are conducted.

There are a number of technical institutes within the Polish military system, e.g. the Military Institute of Engineering and the Air Force Institute of Technology. Only a few of these bodies are of relevance for “soft security”.

During the cold war the **Military University of Technology** (MUT) was the largest military university and the leading research centre in military technology in Poland. In the decade after 1990 the general downsizing of the military system also had an impact on MUT. However, MUT has since then developed into a military-civilian technical university.

The research at MUT covers a wide area of fields within technology, chemistry, physics, economics and military applications. Among the fields relevant for soft security we find for example defence against chemical warfare and environmental protection, extreme meteorological phenomena, computer science and telecommunication systems, medicine, automatic commandment and reconnaissance systems, radio communication and electronic reconnaissance, early warning systems and electronic protection of objects.

The **Military Communication Institute** is more specialised and conducts research and development in the areas of command and control and information systems for Poland’s defence and national security.

One of Poland’s 28 National Technology Platforms is solely dedicated to public security. The platform - **Poland Platform of Homeland Security** - was created in order to create an integrated initiative for the enhancement of public safety. The aim is to allow for closer cooperation between the sectors of science, research and development and education in the field of security. In total, some 580 people both from various research teams and the police, law enforcement and justice are involved in the Platform for Homeland Security. Among the various projects we find: multimedia system to assist the combating of crime (including violence in schools), applications of artificial intelligence to support operational activities, technologies to identify verbal information,

cryptography for communication networks, biometrics for extracting information from images, videos and speech, technologies for the search of citizens in urban environment.

### 3. Public Opinion

According to stakeholders civil security is no big issue for the Polish public, although the younger generation is somewhat more interested in these issues. Otherwise, the interest in security is more directed to “hard” security and one stakeholder said that a typical attitude is: "now that we are part of NATO, there is no problem. US will always back us up".

The development in Russia and the Polish relations to its big neighbour is still a big concern for the Polish people. Although the situation today is totally different compared to two decades ago, Russia is still present in peoples’ minds. It is of course difficult to de-couple Russia from the question of Poland’s future energy supply. Energy security is an issue that occupies some attention in the public opinion, even if it was an even hotter topic one year ago.

Another issue that worries the people of Poland is migration. Here things such as jobs, illegal immigrants and “identity” are mentioned by the stakeholders. This issue has some linkage with border control, as will be discuss below.

From an outsiders point of view organised crime has been considered a substantial problem for Poland. However, according to stakeholders the view among the general public is that this was a bigger problem ten years ago than today.

In a recent poll (EC 2007), peoples’ attitudes towards a more extensive role being played by the European Union in the fields of security was investigated. It was found that a vast majority of the European population would favour a more active role being played by the European Union in general in these fields. In particular, people believe first and foremost that there should be more EU decision-making regarding the fight against organised crime and trafficking (86 percent). The Polish people were even more in favour of such a role for the European Union (91 percent).

In the same investigation, preferences over priorities were investigated. The general result indicates that the Polish opinions fairly well followed the average for the new Member States, se table 3.1 below.

	EU15	New MS	Poland
Fight against organised crime and trafficking	56 %	60 %	57 %
Fight against terrorism	56 %	54 %	56 %
Fight against drugs abuse	35 %	48 %	47 %
Asylum and migration policy	32 %	14 %	11 %
Exchange of police and judicial information between Member States	25 %	22 %	24 %
Promoting and protecting fundamental rights	25 %	22 %	18 %
Quality of justice	20 %	27 %	28 %

Control of external borders	17 %	10 %	9 %
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Table 3.1: Q: "What in your view should be the three priorities for the European Union". Source: EC (2007), question QD2.

The fight against drugs abuse is a very high priority for the Polish people while asylum and migration policy is not considered to be very important. It is perhaps not surprising that promoting and protecting fundamental rights and quality of justice are considered important fields for the new Member States and Poland.

It is interesting to note the low score for control of external borders. One stakeholder said that border control "became a harder problem than we thought it would be", yet only 9 percent in Poland answered that this should be one of three priorities for the European Union. However, it should be noted that this poll only addressed what should be the priorities for the EU, not the individual Member States. At the same time, 79 percent of the Polish people believe more decision-making should take place at the supranational level in the control of external borders (72 percent in EU25) (EC 2007)<sup>5</sup>.

A majority of EU citizens showed concern about data protection issues. This is an issue where the Polish opinion differs from the EU average. Given the question: "Different private and public organisations keep personal information about people. Are you concerned or not that your personal information is being protected by these organisations?" 64 percent in EU27 answered either "Very concerned" or "fairly concerned". The corresponding figure for Poland was 42 percent (EC 2008). This could perhaps partly be explained by the fact that computers are more

According to stakeholders, terrorism is not considered by the Polish public as high priority threat. Climate change is up for discussions but not really seen as a real problem in the public opinion. People are not generally worried and the question is considered too abstract and too far away. According to one stakeholder it is possible to see a distinction between "environmentalist" and "ordinary people".

## 4. Current foresight activities

### 4.1 National foresight activities

In Poland, there exist a number of obstacles to properly carrying out a foresight project. Some of the conditions that affect the implementation are: lack of a systematic approach to challenges that arise from progress in science and technology; over-interpretation of the notion of "autonomy of scientific research"; tendency to copy policy innovation patterns that are not necessarily relevant or appropriate; relatively small share of industry in R&D expenditure; insufficient public debate; lower level of economic development as compared to the EU-15 countries; bureaucracy in public administration and dislike for long-term thinking (Sacio-Szymańska & Kuciński 2007).

Therefore it is perhaps not surprising that the first Polish foresight activity on the national level started as late as 2003: **The Polish Foresight Pilot - Health and Living 2013**. The foresight was initiated and funded by the Minister of Science and Higher Education. The theme "Health and Living" was selected for this pilot study due to the perception that the sciences in this area develops very fast and that this pace of change poses new challenges for policy makers across a

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that Poland had not yet entered the Schengen area at the time of this poll.

range of domains. The aims of the foresight pilot were to speed up the process of predicting development paths that would lead to improvement in the health and quality of life of Polish citizens.

The foresight pilot in the health and life area was completed in 2005. Since then, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education has started the **National Foresight Programme** ([www.foresight.polska2020.pl](http://www.foresight.polska2020.pl)). This programme focuses on the three areas: security, communication and telecommunication technologies and sustainable development. This project has the following aims (Sacio-Szymańska 2007):

- Lay out the development vision of Poland until year 2020;
- Set out scientific priorities of Polish R&D;
- Put the research results into practice;
- Adjust Polish scientific policy to the requirements of the EU;
- Shape the scientific and innovative policy towards Knowledge-Based Economy.

In the Polish National Foresight Programme each area should be assessed with respect to current knowledge in the area and analysed with respect to major issues and topics using selected foresight methods. The area security included economic security (external and internal), intellectual security, social security, technological security and development of civic society.

When completed, the National Foresight Programme should support the Ministry of Science and Higher Education with guidelines in the completion of the strategy for the development of science in Poland by 2015.

#### **4.2 International foresight activities**

We have not been able to identify any international security foresight project with substantial Polish participation.

#### **4.3 Identified threats**

The National Security Strategy is quite clear: The greatest external threat to Polish security is the dependence of Polish economy on supplies of energy resources – crude oil and natural gas – from one source (BBN 2007).

The role of today's and future Russia is always present in a discussion on security in Poland. There are fears that Russia has been attempting to reinforce its position on a regional level. This will of course have influence on Polish security thinking. The role of Russia is also present in the context of energy security.

In a report by the Business Monitor International terrorism and the Polish geographical position were identified as the two foremost non traditional security threats (BMI 2008). This picture is only partly supported by interviews and back office work. When it comes to terrorism, the views diverge. Terrorism is indeed mentioned as a serious threat to Poland in many official policy documents. In the National Security Strategy it is recognised that Poland has to take into account the possibility that it can become the object of attacks in connection with Polish involvement in the anti-terrorist campaign (BBN 2007). Among stakeholders, however, terrorism is not seen as a major threat to Poland.

The Polish geographical position, on the other hand, is though perceived as a serious problem. Border control is today a bigger problem than the Polish community estimated it to be some years ago. Some people hold this as the biggest security problem at the moment. Smuggling of people and drugs is seen as the most worrisome aspect.

Another threat is the widening gap in standard of living between Poland and its neighbours. This, as well as instable political situation and armed conflicts may trigger mass migration movements.

A potential threat to Poland's interests would be a collapse of European integration. It is unclear how this threat is to be interpreted but there seems to be worries over a situation where different states in Europe take on different positions regarding the transatlantic link. For Poland, it is essential to deepen the cooperation within EU in parallel with the building of even stronger links with the US.

As a consequence of Poland's location and the nature and methods of operation of international crime groups, organised crime poses a threat to Poland. Here, there are worries that Poland's integration in the Schengen Agreement would make countermeasures more difficult.

Vulnerability and deliberated attacks on critical infrastructure are also potential threats to Poland and Polish interests. Of special relevance here are threats to the information and communication systems.

Although not prioritised among the public, Poland also faces environmental threats. In this area nuclear power plants, radioactive materials, chemical substances and organic waste, transports of oil and gas via pipelines are relevant.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the National Security Strategy also mentions threats linked to promotion of totalitarian ideologies, racial and ethnic hatred (BBN 2007).

## **5. European collaboration**

The Polish Membership in the European Union determines, to a significant extent, the foundations of the country's security. The membership has a positive effect on the development of national security in all aspects of political, economic and social life at the same time as the possibilities for Poland to act internationally increases. It should, however, be underlined that Poland's ambition with the EU cooperation must go hand in hand with the preservation and further development of the Polish-American link. Poland therefore advocates the development of cooperation between NATO and the EU in order to ensure complementarity of measures undertaken by these institutions.

It is evident that Poland underlines cooperation within the field of "internal security". Among the Polish priorities we find border control. Poland also wants to link this to cooperation in the field of immigration and asylum policy. Poland already has a central position in this field since the "the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, FRONTEX, is based in Warszawa since 2005.

Other areas for cooperation include justice and home affairs, organised crime and terrorism.

A policy area of central concern for Poland is energy security. Here, Poland considers it important for the EU to agree upon a solidarity mechanism of energy security which would provide necessary assistance in case of threat or violation of energy security of any Member State.

The economic transformation and democratisation in central, eastern and southern Europe is of vital importance for Poland. Poland is currently supporting these processes and here the European Union is an important platform for cooperation. Poland would like to boost the role of EU in Eastern Europe by further developing the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Crisis management is another area where Poland wants EU to develop its capabilities.

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## 6. Conclusion

During the last two decades Poland has witnessed a significant change with regards to security issues. The end of the cold war, Poland's entrance into NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004, are the three defining events in Polish contemporary history. At the same time, the older history is always present when trying to grasp what security means for the Polish society, for Poles and for the Republic of Poland.

Despite considerable changes in the security environment, security policies remain strongly concerned with territorial defence. Here, the link to the US is playing an important role for Poland. Poland has emerged as one key allied to the US. Poland supports the US both on the ground and with regards to the US policy. It should however be mentioned that more and more people today consider the EU as an additional security provider. The tight American-Polish link implies the necessity of a balanced policy with regard to EU and the US. In general, the Polish position is that EU and NATO should play complementary roles in building the new security system needed.

Control of borders is key to modern security thinking in Poland. Some people hold border control as the most important security challenge at the moment. Membership of the Schengen region and the geographical position make border control important both for Poland's own sake but also for Poland as a member of the European Union. Border control is related to the issue of migration, an area which many Poles perceive as worrisome. This is an area where Poland seeks European collaboration.

It is of course impossible to bypass the development in Russia and the Polish relations to its big neighbour when discussing security in Poland. Although things have changed, Russia is still present in peoples' minds. Energy security is an example of a security area where things are complicated by the Polish-Russian relationship.

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## Appendix

**Table 1 Organizations**

Organisation	Short Description	Contact Information
<b>National Security Bureau</b> (BBN - Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego,	National Security Bureau realizes entrusted by the President of the Republic of Poland tasks of national security, which arise from its constitutional role of the highest representative of the state and guarantor of the continuity of power and obligation to ensure compliance with the Constitution, to stand guard the sovereignty and security of the country, as well as the inviolability, indivisibility of its territory and to exercise sovereignty over the Armed Forces.	National Security Office 00-909 Warsaw Street. Karowa 10
<b>Department of Homeland Security</b> (Departament Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego	The Department of Homeland Security should: - define the threats to internal security, and development of proposals for ways to remove or minimize them; - collecting and analysing information on the status of internal security; - prepare draft documents that define policy objectives in the field of internal security; -Initiating, participation and monitoring work on the national security strategy, according to the instructions of the Head Office; -opinions and put forward proposals on matters relating to activities planning, organizational and legislative procedures in the field of internal security; -conducting analyses and evaluations of the threat of terrorism; -conducting analyses and evaluations on the state of preparation of state structures to combat terrorism; -To comment ambitions in the implementation of investment in the area of critical infrastructure; -opinions on draft legislation on internal security and the state plans and programmes against threats; -monitoring the activities carried out under the strategy, plans and programmes in the field of internal security; -initiating and opinions on scientific programs - research and development in the field of internal security; -cooperation with the authorities of the parliament and government bodies and the field of government in matters falling within the competence of the Department; -to participate, after receiving the call, in the work of these entities, in terms of projects undertaken in matters falling within the competence of the Department; -the preparation of materials and documents on behalf of the National Security Council; -opinions on applications for the use of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in the territory of the Republic of Poland; -To comment on proposals for the appointment of the first degree and the officer ranks of generalskie officers from the Police, ABW, AW, SKW, SWW, the Border Guard, the Prison Service in relation to the National Fire Brigade - the ranks of generalskie,	National Security Office 00-909 Warsaw Street. Karowa 10
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Foreign affairs administration covers: Poland 's relations with other states and international organizations, representation and protection of interests of the Republic of Poland and of Polish nationals and legal persons abroad, cooperation with Poles living abroad, promotion of the Republic of Poland abroad.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Al. J. Ch. Szucha 23, 00-580 Warsaw tel. (+4822) 523 9000
Ministry of National Defence (MoND)	MoND is responsible for -the management in peacetime all of the activities of the Armed Forces; - the preparation of the assumptions of national defence, including proposals pertaining to the development and structure of the Armed Forces; - the realization of the general assumptions, decisions and directives of the Council of Ministers in the area of national defence; - the execution, within the scope of powers given by the Council of Ministers, of general supervision over the realization of defence-related tasks by the agencies and bodies of the State Administration, State institutions, local authorities, economic entities etc.; - overall leadership in matters connected with the execution of the common duty of national military service; - the fulfilling of international agreements	Al. Niepodległości 218, 00-909 Warszawa tel. 22 6-840-212, 601-213-472, fax 6-840-224

<p>Ministry of Interior and Administration (MIA)</p>	<p>The MI&amp;A group consists of the following agencies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-The National Headquarters of Police</li> <li>-The National Headquarters of Border Guards</li> <li>-The National Headquarters of the State Fire Service</li> <li>-The National Civil Defence</li> <li>-The Government Security Bureau</li> <li>-Head Office Of Geodesy And Cartography</li> <li>-The Volunteer Mountain Rescue Service</li> <li>-The Volunteer Tatra Mountains Rescue Service</li> <li>-The Volunteer Water Rescue Service</li> <li>-The Mazurian Rescue Service</li> <li>-Implementing Authority for European Programmes</li> <li>-The Main School of Fire Service</li> <li>-Scientific and Research Centre for Fire Protection</li> <li>-The Office for Foreigners</li> <li>-The Higher Police Training School</li> </ul>	<p>Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji ul. Stefana Batorego 5, 02-591 Warszawa +48 22 601 44 27, +48 22 845 62 39,</p>
<p>National Civil Defence</p>	<p>Tasks of the National Civil Defence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- preparation of drafts of rules and principles of civil defence operations;</li> <li>- determination of general rules of performing civil defence tasks;</li> <li>- coordination of specific projects and controlling performance of civil defence tasks</li> </ul>	<p>ul. Batorego 5, 02-591 Warsaw POLAND tel.+48 022 60 143 12 fax +48 022 60 140 03</p>

**Table 2 Strategies and doctrines**

Strategy	Short Description	Contact Information
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland	The Republic of Poland's National Security Strategy contains the official interpretation of the Polish national interests, identifies the Republic of Poland's strategic goals in the area of security and sets out how it plans to achieve them, taking into account tasks allocated to different executive subsystems. The National Security Strategy also describes ways in which the national security system will be maintained and the directions of transformation of the national security system.	National Security Office 00-909 Warsaw Street. Karowa 10
Be More Careful	Be More Careful is more of a guide than a strategy. It contains information and a list of measures designed to help people make the preparations in case of the most common dangerous events and during the planning of securing house or apartment.	Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji ul. Stefana Batorego 5, 02-591 Warszawa +48 22 601 44 27, +48 22 845 62 39,
S2		
Energy Policy of Poland Until 2025		

**Table 3 Private sector**

Name	Short Description	Contact information
Bumar group	Bumar sp. z o.o., a leading supplier and exporter of armaments and military equipment manufactured in the Polish defence industry, is the dominant entity of the Bumar Group. The Group consists of 19 manufacturing and trading defence sector companies specializing in munitions, radars, rockets and armour as well as construction, agricultural plant, and construction service companies.	Jana Pawla II No. 11 Av. 00-828 Warszawa, Poland bumar@bumar.com tel. +4822 311 25 12 fax +4822 311 26 42

**Table 4 Current Research programs**

Name	Short Description	Contact information
Military University of Technology (MUT)	<p>MUT offers programmers for all levels of university education: Bachelor's, Master's and Doctor's. The University conducts more than 50 university level courses in 10 fields of education for civilian and military students. It provides education in engineering, applied science and management, training highly qualified civilian and military engineers, managers and commanders.</p> <p>In the academic year 2005/2006 over 6,500 students are studying at MUT, and they are educated by highly qualified research and teaching staff, among them there are over 150 professors and 350 doctors supported by 200 assistants and instructors</p> <p>The University conducts research, implementation and modernization within the scope of technology, chemistry, physics, economics and military applications.</p>	<p>Gen. S. Kaliskiego 2. St., 00-908 Warsaw 49 Poland +48 22 683 97 33</p>
National Technology Platform of Homeland Security	<p>The Polish Platform for Homeland Security was established with the aim of creating integrated technology and computer tools to support activities enhancing public security. At the same time, it fosters cooperation in the area of security among the fields of science, research and development, and education.</p>	<p>Main Coordinator: Professor Emil W. Plywaczewski plywacz@uwb.edu.pl</p>

**Table 5 Identified threats**

<b>Name of the Treath</b>	<b>Short Description</b>
Energy security	The use of energy as an instrument for political pressure and the growing competition for energy carriers increase risks in vicinity of Poland.
Terrorism	Poland recognise the possibility that the country can become the object of terrorist actions in connection with its involvement in the anti-terrorist campaign.
Regional instability	A widening of the gap in standard of living between Poland and its neighbours could cause instable political situation with armed conflicts and mass migration movements.
Threat against critical infrastructure	Information and telecommunication systems are of high priority.
Environmental threats	Important tasks include improvement of the purity of water, reduction of air pollution, prevention of soil degradation and limitation of the risk of occurrence of environmental disasters from natural causes or caused by man and to minimise their effects by developing chemical and environmental rescue system.
Trafficking	Related to border control.
Smuggling of drugs	Related to border control.
Smuggling of weapons	Related to border control.