

 **FORESEC** - Europe's evolving security: drivers, trends and scenarios

**FORESEC Deliverable D 2
Country report on Sweden**

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Introduction

This country report on Sweden represents one of the 12 country reports that have been compiled as part of the FORESEC project's State of the Art Scan on European security (see further about the project at www.foresec.eu). The scan provides an overview of the security field in the 12 countries chosen. The countries have been selected to give a good overview of the different cultures, geographical locations, national strategies and societal challenges that face European security and shape the priorities and interest at the European level.¹

Section 1 of the report discusses the concept of security in Sweden, sections 2 looks at the current security related activities including organisations, strategies and doctrines, role of the private sector, key technologies and current research programs and projects. Section 3 discusses the public opinion in Sweden vis-à-vis security threats and technologies. Section 4 gives an overview of current national and international foresight activities and section 5 highlights issues where European level collaboration is seen to have most added value. For most sections, further details are provided in the Appendix.

1. Concept of Security

Since the end of the cold war, the Swedish society has witnessed a relatively intense and vivid discussion on the concept of security and what it could mean in relation to the Swedish state, to the society and to the individual. Since the late eighties and early nineties it is not only the end of the cold war that complicates matters. In fact, it is a range of event and trends that together form the context in which Sweden has to navigate its policy for safety and security.

During the last 25 years Sweden has gone through a number of "national catastrophes" that perhaps make Sweden a little special in a European context. In any case, these contribute to shape today's perception of what safety and security mean to Swedes and Swedish society. The assassination of Prime minister Olof Palme in 1986 stand out as a national shock that in many sense awakened the Swedish society from its - in some eyes - naïve view of how open a modern society in reality can be. After that, Sweden has lost another minister when Anna Lindh was stabbed in Stockholm in 2003. In 1998 Sweden experienced one of the worst fires in Europe in peace time when 63 youth lost their life when a night club in Gothenburg was burned down. In the deadliest maritime disaster ever in Europe, Sweden alone lost more than 500 citizens out of the 852 people that drowned when the car ferry MS Estonia sunk in the Baltic sea 1994.

The disaster in south-east Asia in connection with the tsunami in 2004 hit Sweden seriously. Of the countries not physically affected, Sweden probably lost most people in relation to the total population. In Europe Sweden lost more than 500 citizens (dead and missing) and Germany more than 600. In a Nordic perspective, Sweden lost three times more people per capita than the average of Denmark, Finland and Norway. The deficiency in the public administration and the Government Offices to handling serious crises caused a great deal of debate in the Swedish society. A special commission was appointed in 2005 to evaluate how Swedish government authorities handled their part of the assistance efforts for Swedes caught up in the disaster.²

In Sweden, there is broad agreement that the security of the society is founded on cooperation with other countries. The United Nations is of central importance in the Swedish foreign policy. It is a broad national consensus that a well-functioning multilateralism is necessary to be able to solve many of the greatest problems of our times and Sweden has the ambition to be a force for

¹ The FORESEC state of the art scan covers Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

² The Swedish Tsunami Commission. See also SOU (2005).

strengthening and improving work in the United Nations. The role of the European Union in Swedish foreign and security policy has increased and today there is an important link between the Swedish security policy and Sweden's policy on Europe. It is the conviction that a more secure Europe implies improved chances for increased security for Sweden as well. Sweden act proactively for developing the EU into a global actor in peace and security and an important instrument is the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Government underlines that this must not be done at the cost of a weakened transatlantic link.

Sweden is not part of any military alliance and the question whether Sweden should join NATO is not a real political issue. In the Swedish parliament (the Riksdag) there is only one political party that actively speaks for a Swedish membership. Notwithstanding, Sweden is continuously developing the already extensive cooperation with NATO. In close cooperation with Finland, Sweden is investigating the possibility of participating in the NATO Response Force.

The last couple of years have witnessed an increased cooperation in the Nordic and Baltic Sea region on defence and security related matters. Some commentators say that the cooperation in this region is more intense and close than for a very long time. So far, the cooperation is most developed with Finland and Norway. In for example the SUCFIS³ cooperation Finland and Sweden exchange daily maritime picture information of the Baltic Sea between the two countries. One catalyst for Nordic cooperation is the Nordic Battle Group where troops from Finland, Norway, Estonia and Sweden participate.⁴ The Government recently opened up for deepening cooperation throughout the region in what is called "soft security policy".

If is of course impossible to discuss the concept of security in Sweden without mentioning Russia. During the cold war, Russia was the main actor setting the Swedish agenda on defence policy. Today, things are different and it is in Sweden's interest that Russia develops into a modern, successful and democratic state. During the last couple of year, however, there has been an increased concern in the Swedish security environment over the Russian development. The Government recently expressed its concern about Russia moving in a more authoritarian direction (The Government 2008a).

Another issue is terrorism. Most people would say that terrorism is not an important aspect when trying to conceptualise security in Sweden. Terrorism is more a phenomenon that influences Sweden's foreign view on security and it is seen as an international challenge that calls for joint cooperation. In these joint efforts Sweden stresses the security of the individual.

The threats of terrorism are also related to another issue that has gained much more momentum over the last years, namely the responsibility of the state for its citizens abroad. The main driver, however, is the tsunami disaster when it becomes evident that there exist a gap between people's expectations and the capacity of the state.

Also Climate change and its impacts have found its way into the Swedish security debate. The Swedish Defence Commission in its most recent review brought this up as one of the most serious threats to the Swedish society and Swedish interests (The Swedish Defence Commission 2007). The challenges associated with climate change were also included in the Government's latest statement on Sweden's foreign policy.

First and foremost, the security problems associated with climate change will probably not influence Sweden. It has been argued that in the short- to medium term perspective, climate change is unlikely to change the structures of international security. This may, however, change over the long term (Haldén 2007).

³ Sea Surveillance Co-operation Finland Sweden.

⁴ Ireland also participate in the Nordic Battle Group.

There is a link between climate change and another issue that during the last decade or so has influenced the way security is perceived in Sweden, namely energy security. Energy security is a wider concept than energy safety which is mainly concerned with physical safety supply (e.g. critical infrastructures). Energy security can be defined as to include issues that have bearing on the strategic, political, military, foreign policy and economic field (Larsson 2007a). Hence it includes both security of supply issues as well as political and security issues related to e.g. trade policy.

Climate change may give new possibilities to extract oil and gas in the Arctic. The question has been asked whether this could lead to conflicts over these new resources (CNA 2007). Even if Sweden is not directly involved, like e.g. Norway, this could mean new international tension in the near vicinity of Swedish borders.

Another relatively new concept in the Swedish debate is economic security. For a small and export dependent country like Sweden, security of the supply chain is a key to national security. Few stakeholders see serious threats, e.g. terrorism, to Swedish supply chains. However, since chains of commerce today are so interlinked, an attack in another EU country would harm Swedish interests seriously. In reality, Swedish stakeholders, i.e. exporters and importers, are more worried over the increased administrative burden when new security regulations are introduced (Swedish Chamber of Commerce 2008). They argue that it is important to apply a rational risk assessment approach when assessing investments in new systems for surveillance of supply chains. It is important with a balanced view of surveillance and the importance of keeping the flow going. There is a risk that protectionist interests will use new surveillance technologies as a means to push their position forward.

In the discussion, as also in policy papers, the emergence of a number of new threats have led to the concept of a "broader threat panorama". During the cold war, it was one well-defined threat, whereas today's situation consists of a number of threats that are, perhaps not that serious, but more unpredictable. As a consequence, the state's responses have to be broadened and one stakeholder described the situations as: "from security policy to policy for security".

Sweden's increased participation in international operations is one corner stone of the emerging new conceptualisation of security. An important development is the trend to bring foreign policy, aid policy and defence policy closer together so as to improve coordination between them. It is the view of the Government that today's complex security environment make it counter-productive to conduct traditional foreign and security policy, trade policy and aid policy as separate pillars. The ambition is to implement a new "global development policy" including relevant elements from many policy areas.

In Sweden, there are different views among stakeholders as to the meaning of the terms security and safety. The most widespread view is that security is related to threats of intentional origin, while safety is connected to non-intentional threats, e.g. failure in critical infrastructure systems. During the interviews an alternative interpretation was found which applies for system owners. In this view, a safety problem is a problem that is caused by the systems that are under our control. This applies regardless if the problem (threat) is intentional or not. If, on the other hand, the problem can be traced to a system outside our system it is defined as a security problem. In the case of safety, it does not matter if the threat is intentional or not.

An interesting Swedish word in this context is "trygghet". In dictionaries "trygghet" is usually considered to be synonymous to security [säkerhet], but the two words have slightly different connotations. One hint is that "social security" is translated into "social trygghet". The word "trygghet" is mostly used in a social context, e.g. in relation to economic or health issues. Another view on the differences is that "trygghet" is related to the subjective experience of something, while

security describes the situation objectively. In many cases the two words are used with a somewhat unspecified “and” in between: Security and “trygghet”.

2. Current security related activities

In Sweden, the concept of “total defence” play a key role in defending Sweden against armed attack, to assert territorial integrity, to contribute to peace and security at the global scale and to strengthen the society to meet peacetime emergencies. The total defence is composed of two parts: military defence and civil defence.

The military defence system main task is to defend Sweden against armed attack, no matter what its source. The Swedish defence system is currently undergoing a reformation from a defence force against invasion into a flexible, smaller, yet more effective defence which can both defend Sweden and take part in international operations. As things are right now, the priorities within the Swedish Armed Forces are to the latter.

One of the aims of the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces is to utilise modern information and communications technology in command and control systems so that the armed forces should be able to function together with other total defence agencies (e.g. in the civil defence sphere) in times of peace, emergencies and war. If successful, this will increase the capacity of the society to cope with serious crises or emergencies in a coordinated manner.⁵

The other part of the total defence, civil defence, embraces the whole of society including all the services (e.g. critical infrastructures, health care etc.) that need to function in times of crisis in peace or in war. The objectives of civil defence are to protect the civilian population, contribute to peace and security in the world at large and strengthen society's ability to prevent and manage severe peacetime emergencies. Civil defence is not an organisation, it should rather be thought of as a number of activities conducted by society to strengthen its capacity to deal with crisis. Since civil defence embraces a range of functions of society the responsibility is spread out over a range of ministries and agencies.

A key notion in Sweden is the role of “joint responsibility”. It clearly stated that the public sector has a principal responsibility but the burden must be shared with the business sector and individuals. Exactly how the division of responsibility is to be organised as to optimise the security system is constantly debated and some would argue that the borders are in many case fuzzy. On example under constant debate is IT security.

It is important to note the special relationship between the government and its agencies in Sweden where the government does not exercise detailed control of the authorities and agencies. The control is exercised by laws, regulations and by distribution of funds.

By definition a crisis always has consequences on a local level, where there are 290 (relatively) independent municipalities. The municipalities have a so-called geographic area responsibility and they have a key role in the work of emergency preparedness. At the next level, the regional level, there are authorities and agencies under the control of the Government, police authorities and 21 county administrative boards. The county administrative boards have geographic area responsibility on the regional level. The area responsibility means that municipalities and county administrative boards should act to promote co-ordination between government authorities and other parties; they do not take over the responsibilities of other parties.

⁵ Note, however, the national trauma associated with the Ådalen shooting in 1931 when five people very shoot dead by military personnel. This still complicate matters in discussion over civil-military cooperation in Sweden.

In any system where many agencies and other bodies are involved there exists a problem of co-ordination. In Sweden the idea is that there should be one co-ordinating body on each level of society. On the local level, the municipalities have so-called geographic area responsibility and the county administrative boards have the responsibility on the regional level. The Government have, of course, the responsibility of co-ordination on the national level. Some stakeholders mention the problem to define what is the national level, or when should a crisis be considered "national".

Finally we note that the Swedish emergency management system has been under investigation for a number of years. The government note that as the threats and risks in society is changing, the systems and procedures for dealing with these threats and risks must also be developed and renewed. Societal changes and experience of major accidents and disasters of various kinds, both in Sweden and the outside world, motivate new approaches for emergency management. The government therefore proposed that a new authority should be established on 1 January 2009 (The Government 2007b, 2008b). The new authority will work with coordination within and between central authorities, regions and municipalities. The authority will work preventive as well as during and after a crisis or accident.

At time of writing there is a organisational committee working on implementation of the new authority which will be named the Authority for Protection of Society and Preparedness (MSB - Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap).⁶

2.1 Organisations⁷

The **Ministry of Defence** (MoD) has five areas of responsibility. Of course, MoD is responsible for the total defence concept as discussed above. The "Defence Reform" is another area of responsibility. It is the most revolutionary transformation of the armed forces in modern Swedish history. The reform is often phrased as "from invasion defence to a flexible operational defence for Sweden and international operations". A third area is called "protection and preparation against accidents" which includes measures to prevent and limit the consequences of accidents, where property, environment or population is harmed. The fourth area of responsibility is "severe peacetime emergencies", by which is meant emergencies that encompass a number of different areas of society. The last area is the one which currently occupies much of the ministry's attention, namely "international peace support and humanitarian operations".

Of the Ministry's ten government agencies, the **Swedish Emergency Management Agency** (SEMA) has a central role in relation to the context of this report. The emergency management system in Sweden is based on a "holistic approach". It aims at developing robustness and the capability to manage peace time emergencies as well as war time crises. SEMA is the main body in this work which is organised along six so-called coordination areas:

- Technical infrastructure
- Transport
- Spreading of toxic substances
- Economic security
- Co-ordination, interaction and information by area
- Protection, rescue and care

Even though SEMA is an agency under MoD, in each of these coordination areas a number of agencies and governmental authorities outside MoD share responsibility for planning and coordinating security and emergency measures within their specific area. Municipalities,

⁶ The translation is according to the author. I have not been able to find any official translation to English.

⁷ It should be noted that, since 1998 there is no Ministry of the Interior in Sweden.

organisations and the business sector are also included in this work. SEMA focuses on major crises and emergencies and leaving other incidents to the regional and local levels.

SEMA is not an operative agency. SEMA's role in the event of a crisis is instead to give support (advice on e.g. crisis communication and management methodology) to other public actors, e.g. municipalities, county councils and government authorities. An important task of SEMA is to follow-up and evaluation activities after crises. This is often done in close collaboration with the relevant authorities and municipalities.

Besides SEMA, the following of MoD's agencies are of particular relevance in the present context. The **Swedish Coast Guard** is responsible for surveillance, supervision and control with regard to security, fishing and the environment around the Swedish coast. The **Swedish Accident Investigation Board** investigates air, marine and rail accidents, as well as other serious accidents in order to improve safety. The **National Board of Psychological Defence** carry investigations of public opinion of relevance to security and defence issues. It also gives advice on contingency planning and the preparedness of the media for serious peacetime emergencies.⁸ Rescue services and measures to prevent accidents and damage, both in Sweden and internationally, are the responsibilities of the **Swedish Rescue Services Agency**.

As of January 1 2009, SEMA, the National Board of Psychological Defence and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency will cease to exist when the new authority MSB is formed. However, most of the functionalities of these three agencies will be transformed into MSB.

Two areas of responsibility of the **Ministry of Foreign Affairs** are relevant in the present context. First, the ministry is of course responsible for the Government's standpoints in foreign policy. Second, the responsibility of safeguarding the interests of individual Swedish citizens and organisations abroad is also among the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As mentioned above, climate change and the environment have entered into the security discussion in Sweden. Therefore the **Ministry of the Environment** is also of relevance. The responsibility area "energy and climate" include both the issue of reduction of greenhouse gases and energy policy with the aim of guaranteeing the supply of energy.

Legislation and justice is the responsibility of the **Ministry of Justice**. The Ministry is responsible for the police service which means formulating targets and guidelines for the work of the police. As in any other area, the ministry has no authority to decide how the police should apply a law or make a ruling in different cases. The Ministry of Justice is also responsible for the national strategy to meet the threat of terrorism (see further below, section 2.2).

Partly as a consequence of the inability of the Swedish public administration to handle the tsunami disaster, a new organisation was formed within the Government Offices in January 2008. The idea is that crisis management should be based upon a cross-sector joint approach and be coordinated by the Prime Minister's office. It is stated that planning and preparing for crises requires an executive leadership that cuts across the responsibility of each individual ministry. The main mission of this new unit, the **National crisis management centre**, is to monitor the development within and outside Sweden and to analyse threats. The Centre will identify and bench-mark crisis management capabilities and make sure that all ministries have a crisis management plan. The centre will also be the point of contact with other bodies with similar functions or responsibilities in other countries and within the joint EU crisis management structures. It is important to recognise that the national crisis management centre is not a "leading" agency.

⁸ See also chapter 3.

A very influential body within the security policy domain in Sweden is the **Swedish Defence Commission**. The commission consists of one member from each of the parties in Parliament (the Riksdag). Its main objective is undertake studies on long term developments of Swedish security and defence policy issues. The Defence Commission is responsible for consultation between representatives of the Government and of the parliamentary parties. An important aspect is that the Defence Commission should strive for political consensus as far as possible. The commission should also stimulate a public debate over issues related to security and defence policy.

2.2 Strategies and doctrines

Given the large number of governmental agencies and authorities involved in the Swedish security domain, the number of strategies is also very large. The government possess its strategies which also the central agencies do. The police and the coast guard do also have their strategies for fulfilling their objectives. It is evident that it is necessary to limit the review of strategies and doctrines to a few particularly relevant ones for the current study. This selection is based on a hierarchy from the national, via the regional to the local level of society. In reality it might be the case that a strategy on the local level is more informative with regard to the research questions of this project, compared to the a national strategy. Notwithstanding, we think that if a selection has to be made, it is better to start at the top in the hierarchy and study a few strategies.

At the very top of the hierarchy we find **Sweden's security policy** which was formulated in 2002 and is still valid. Back then Sweden had a minority Government formed by the Social Democratic Party and an agreement was reached with three other parties of the Parliament: the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party.⁹

In the policy it is stated that the primary goal of Sweden's security policy is to preserve peace and the country's independence. It is further stated that the aim is that Sweden should contribute to stability and security in our neighbourhood and work for strengthen international peace and security. The policy underlines that security in the future most be understood as something wider than the absence of military conflicts. At the international level, the policy stresses the importance of the United Nations and EU as important organisations for Sweden's ability to fulfil its security objectives.

The policy from 2002 is still the foundation of Sweden's security policy. The Government's **Statement of Foreign Policy**, which is presented to the Parliament each year, indicates visions and aims for Sweden's relations to other countries and the world outside Sweden. In this statement the Government can present more specific views on its strategy with regard to security policy. An indication of the importance of the EU is that the first heading of the latest statement is "The EU as a global actor". The government's statement says that the EU should be developed into global actor especially in peace and security. The statement also mentions the EU's principle of solidarity in security.

Although most stakeholders do not consider terrorism being a serious threat to the Swedish society, there exist a national strategy published by the government (The Government 2007a, Hansén 2007).

The government bill "**Cooperation in crisis - for a more secure society**" (The Government 2005) defines much of the foundational structure for civil security in Sweden. This bill could be seen as a follow up and answer by the government on a proposal by the Defence Commission (Defence Commission 2005) of a new Swedish security strategy.

⁹ The current government has a majority in the Riksdag and is formed by the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party.

According to the strategy, the goals for Swedish security should be to safeguard:

1. The life and health of the Swedish population,
2. The functionality of the Swedish society,
3. The ability to preserve the Swedish fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law and human freedoms and rights.

The strategy discusses the problem of security from the perspectives of the individual, the society and the international community. The conclusion drawn is that the emphasis of the security strategy should be on security of society. This means that the functionality of society should be threatened; examples include the democratic state ruled by law, health and medical care, information and communication systems, energy supply and flows of goods and services. In real situation it is of course difficult to define when a crisis is not to be considered to influence the society and not only individuals. There is no clear cut answer, but a hint is given by one of the stakeholders who said that a crisis is "national" when the prime minister has to answer questions from the media.

Three basic principles guide the Swedish emergency management system. First, the principle of responsibility states that whoever is responsible for an activity in normal conditions should be responsible during major emergencies. Second, the principle of parity means that during major emergencies authorities should, as far as possible, be organised and located in the same way as they are under normal conditions. Finally, the principle of proximity means that major emergencies should be managed at the lowest possible decision making level and be supported by regional and national levels only when necessary.

A key idea in the strategy is what is called "an integrated approach to security". The integrated approach applies both to the threats to security, to the goals of the security work as well as the means to strengthen the security of society. One example of the latter is the international dimension where the work in EU is particularly emphasised. The strategy discusses for example, Sweden's relation to ESDP, Intergovernmental Declaration of Solidarity and the instrument Community mechanism for rescue service. During the storm known as Gudrun¹⁰ Sweden received assistance via this mechanism and the strategy underlines the need for appropriate preparedness to receive and manage international help. Of course, EU is not the only international organisation mentioned, but it is evident that EU occupies a special role in this strategy.

It is interesting to note that the strategy discusses the importance of strengthening the dialogue between people of different cultural and ethnic background. This is seen as a measure against trends towards increased tension between different ethnic groups in society.

2.3 Private Sector

The private sector is relevant in at least three ways. Perhaps the first thing one starts to think of is the comparable large defence industry in Sweden. The second aspect is in connection with the idea of joint responsibility in society as discussed above. The last aspect is that the private sector in itself has its security needs.

The defence industry has traditionally played a vital role in the Swedish security and defence policy. During the cold war the interest of the defence industry coincided with those of the state. The industry developed and produced the defence equipment needed by the defence forces. After the end of the cold war things have changed and the agenda of the industry is nowadays more independent (Axelson & Lundmark 2002).

¹⁰ Gudrun was the name given to a powerful storm that hit Sweden in January 2005. The storm blew down 75 million m³ wood.

Sweden belongs to six largest defence industry nations in Europe. For more than a decade, Sweden has witnessed a restructuring that has completely altered the industrial landscape. Global trends such as new corporate structures and international co-operations have had far-reaching consequences for the Swedish defence industry. Today, the industry sector has substantial foreign ownership and the Government has sold all state-owned interests. Instead of talking about a Swedish defence industry, it is perhaps more appropriate to talk about a defence industry in Sweden.

There have been institutional changes facilitating internationalisation and cross border co-operation, but also a clear political demand on the industry to consolidate its resources domestically and co-operate internationally. During the last ten years the Swedish security and defence industry has been subject to extensive restructuring actions which have resulted in a substantial foreign ownership. Volvo Aero (engines, engine and aviation services), EuroMaint (Maintenance) PartnerTech AB (electronics supplier) are today the only large companies totally owned by Swedish industrial interests. Of the larger companies Bofors and Hägglunds are owned by the British company BAE Systems while Kockums is owned by the German company ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. BAE Systems also holds 20 percent of Sweden's largest defence industry, Saab. The markets for defence industries in Sweden have also changed. In 2005, the export exceeded 50 per cent for the first time.

During recent years we have seen tendency to gradually shift emphasis from "defence" industry to "security" industry. This can be seen as the industrial reaction to the broader conceptualisation of security in Sweden. One sign of this development is the that the Association of Swedish Defence Industries (Defind) has changed name to Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association (SOFF). It is still the case, though, that the member companies represent rather traditional defence industry sectors. As an example, Securitas, is not a member of SOFF. Securitas, which is listed at the Stockholm exchange market since 1991, focuses on security services, including specialised guarding and monitoring. The Securitas group also include a consulting branch and investigation services through Pinkerton. Total sales in 2007 amounted to 6 700 M€. This could be compared with Saab's figures of 2 400 M€ and the sum of SOFF's all member companies of 4 000 M€.

The second aspect of the private sector is the "joint responsibility" in the emergency management system. As noted above, the doctrine in Sweden is that emergency management is a joint responsibility for the private and public sectors. Concerns have been raised among stakeholders that cooperation is not something that will emerge automatically. It is also a matter of finding the right incentives that are applicable in a business environment. Sometimes it has been proposed that public funds should be invested in projects providing an incentive for companies to cooperate. In general the problem is to find the right balance between market logic and regulation. One case in point in Sweden is supply of electricity and natural disasters. Another aspect is problems related to the Official Secrets Act. A companies in the business sector must be sure that sensitive information does not land up in the hands of a competitor.

The third point is that the private sector is also an end-user of public security and safety. This interest from the business sector in these questions has increased during the last decades. The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) is Sweden's largest business federation representing member companies with some 1.5 million employees. Through its Risk and Security Board (NSD – Näringslivets säkerhetsdelegation) they work on a number of issues related to security for the business sector. Among other things, the NSD work on legislation to meet the needs of business, both in theory and practice. They also initiate and run development projects within the security field (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 2007).

Another example of the third aspect is the recent report issued by the National Board of Trade on Supply Chain Security (National Board of Trade 2007). In the report a study of all security

initiatives relating to the supply chain in force since 11th September 2001 is reported. In the report it is shown that security initiatives continue to expand. One line of argument is that it is necessary to relate the costs of security measures to the possible costs of e.g. a terrorist attack and subsequent disruption of the international supply chain. The report concludes that the formulation of security initiatives needs to include trade facilitation measures.

2.4 Key technologies

Key technologies can of course mean different things. A technology could be key to the business sector, to national interests or to the security of the citizens. The last aspect, security of the citizens, are left out here. Before the end of the cold war the need for the country and the industry to a large extent coincided. Since then there are signs of divergence as the industry now seek to meet demand from an international market.

The defence industry in Sweden is very broad but the main sectors are command and control systems, telecommunications systems, surface vessels and submarines, combat aircraft, combat vehicles, aircraft engines, radar systems, short and long-range weapons systems, systems for exercise and training and security services. This broad spectrum implies that there also is a relatively large number of technologies that are of vital importance for the industry. Among the key technologies for the industry we find information and communications technology (ICT) in general, IT security, information fusion, stealth technologies, system engineering, material technology, CBRN related technologies, technologies for simulation and virtual reality applications and sensor technology, aviation technology, underwater technologies and telematics, IR technologies, biometrics and positioning systems (GPS, Galileo etc.).

It is difficult to provide a comprehensive picture over the societal needs of technologies within the soft security field. Some hints could be found by inspection of what kind of research is funded by the major research funders in the area (see further section 2.5 below). Although SEMA's focus is on social sciences in its research programme, the agency also funds some more technology oriented projects, e.g. software development of warning system for pandemics, electromagnetic terrorism, robustness of the power grid and vulnerability of railway systems. In the joint programme between the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA), the Defence Materiel Administration and SEMA (see section 2.5 below) radar technology, detection of explosives, technologies for virus detection and IR camera technologies are currently supported.

It was pointed out by one of the stakeholders that the importance of the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI) in the crisis management system is increasing. This could be linked to the increasing interest in technologies for environmental surveillance.

2.5 Current research programs and research projects

In 2004 the Swedish Government assigned a number of agencies to draw up a joint proposals on a national strategy for security research (Vinnova 2005). This assignment could be seen as a response to the European Commission's work to initiate the Preparatory Action for Security Research (EU 2004). The aim was to adapt Sweden to the foreseen research landscape.

The final report delivered by the group of agencies stated that it is important for Sweden "to create new knowledge and an effective innovation system in the security area as soon as possible in order to position Sweden in the European and American security research programmes now under development" (Vinnova 2005, p. 1). One of the proposals was to create a national research and development programme within the security field.

A few years later, the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA), the Defence Materiel Administration and SEMA jointly launched a research funding program within the field of safety and

security. The three agencies points out that in order to meet threats from organised crime, terrorists and irregular forces as well as other crises and disasters, need-driven research is required. The main objective of the programme is: “by 2010, to utilise Swedish research and industry to significantly contribute to increased security in Sweden and the world around us” (REF). The interdisciplinary programme is funded in the period 2007-2009. Another goal is to promote innovation and economic growth in the security industry by involving industry partners in research consortium. It is also explicitly stated that the programme aims to make it easier for Swedish research groups to participate in the European research programmes and American security research programmes.

The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) supports research within the area of emergency management and conducts horizon scanning and strategic analyses. The research budget is 7 M€ per year. Just like the above discussed programme, SEMA’s research activities have an international ambition. It is or example, possible to apply for funds for the preparation of applications to Theme Security under the seventh framework programme.

The research funded by SEMA can be divided into three groups: vulnerability of society, emergency management and threats. Multidisciplinary projects are common. SEMA puts a lot of effort into dissemination of research results and the agency organises a number of seminars and conferences each year. One of the aims of these activities, besides the obvious one to spread results to decision makers and other stakeholders, is not create networks between different research disciplines within the security field.

Research in the security field is conducted at the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC). Much of the research activities can be associated with the military field, but there are also a number of activities related to civil security. The centre CRISMART (National Centre for Crisis Management Research and Training) develops competence and knowledge about crisis management. The European Security Research Programme conducts research into EU security and crisis management and especially EU’s capabilities and limitations in dealing with crises that threaten its fundamental values, societal functions and citizens.

The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) with its staff of approximately 800 scientists and researchers hosts a number of research programmes of relevance for civil security. The main research funder is the Swedish Defence Forces, but the agency also attracts funds from e.g. SEMA and the EU. The research at FOI is structured in eight programmes: i) Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance; ii) Electronic warfare; iii) Human systems; iv) Operational research, modelling and simulation; v) Protection against CBRN and other hazardous substances; vi) Security, safety and vulnerability analysis; vii) Sensors and low observables and viii) Strike and protection.

Another activity worth mentioning - although it might not be called “research” – is the yearly co-ordinated exercises (SAMÖ). The purpose of latest exercise, SAMÖ 2007, was to assess society’s collected crisis management capability. In the exercise, more than forty governmental agencies, municipalities and organisations on the national, regional and local levels participated. SAMÖ 2007 was conducted in the form of a simulation exercise in real time during three days. Field exercises were also included in SAMÖ 2007. The crisis emanated from an antagonistic attack on different spots around Stockholm (SEMA 2007).

3. Public Opinion

In general, the Swedish people feel safe and have high confidence in the criminal justice system. The confidence in the society’s capability of manage crises is, however, lower.

In Sweden, The National Board of Psychological Defence (SPF) conducts a yearly poll of public attitudes towards Swedish society, security policy, international affairs and defence. In the survey of 2007 a sample of 2 020 individuals were contacted and the response rate was 49 percent.

One main conclusion from the survey was that an increasing proportion of the population has no opinion about current issues in the area of security and/or defence policy. SPF draws does not provide any conclusive answer on this, but they argue for an increasing risk of a division of the population into two groups: one already initiated and one group of people excluded from the discussion on security issues. SPF also discusses if the broadening of the security field, i.e. the inclusion of crisis management, society's safety and international operations, has made the subject more diffuse. If that is the case, it is better to leave these complicated decisions to others.

The poll shows that most Swede's are more worried over global climate change, the use of the world's natural resources as well as organized crime than about an armed conflict in the vicinity of Sweden or Sweden being targeted by a terrorist attack (SPF 2007).

In the question over different countries and nations importance for peace and security in Europe, more than 80 percent answered that the UN "contribute" or "contribute substantially" to peace and security in Europe. The corresponding figures for EU and NATO were 57 and 53 percent respectively. However, many individuals showed a negative outlook on the importance of the US and Russia for peace and security in and around Europe (SPF 2007, Table 08).

The poll further shows that the majority feel it is right to increase the number of Swedish soldiers involved in international operations (SPF 2007, Table 14).¹¹ There is a positive attitudes towards a Swedish contribution to the EU's battle groups (SPF 2007, Table 16) and UN/EU led operations are more favourable than NATO led operations. In general, membership in the EU and military nonalignment are valued positively, 40 percent want to stay outside NATO (SPF 2007, Tables 25, 26).

An interesting table in the report by SPF is no. 32. This table presents the views over how confident Swedes are in the society's capability to handle different emergency situations. One of three answers were allowed: sufficient capability, insufficient capability or no opinion. In the case of a terrorist attack (which people regard as rather unlikely) only 15 percent answered "sufficient capability", while for a pandemic the corresponding figure is 32 percent. The society's capability to handle a natural disaster is judged to be sufficient by 29 percent.

The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå - Brottsförebyggande rådet), the Government's body of expertise within the judicial system, publish the The Swedish Crime Survey (Brå 2007). The survey covers a wide area of crime statistics, but here we only focus on two results. First, fear of crime. The general result shows that most of the adult feel safe in Sweden. Over 80 percent do not consider that the fear of crime has a negative effect on their quality of life. However, there are large differences across different groups in the Swedish society. One clear result is that women feel more unsafe than men (Brå 2007, Table 11). Also young people feel more unsafe than adult men. Not surprisingly, people how have themselves experienced crime feel more unsafe (Brå 2007, Table 12).

The second aspect of relevance here is public confidence in the criminal justice system. Here, the general result is that this relatively high in Sweden. There are however difference between the different agencies within the criminal justice system. Confidence in the police, prosecutors and courts are relatively high. The confidence in prison is however lower.

¹¹ See however the argument put forward by Bjereld (2008).

Interestingly, one of the stakeholders stated that much of what the government and the agencies do in the emergency management system concerning civil security is not what the man in the street is primarily interested in. What matter to “ordinary people” is mostly things that fall within the responsibility of the police; security in my neighbourhood, the ability to walk in the streets in the night etc.

4. Current foresight activities

4.1 National foresight activities

How many foresights one can find in Sweden is dependent on how one defines the concept foresight. In the following we are going to take the simplest possible definition in order to identify activities of relevance for the current study. Therefore, our simple definition is “forward looking activity which (at least partly) covers the field of safety and/or security”. Despite this very broad definition it is hard to find many activities in Sweden under this heading.

During the years 2006 – 2008 the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences run a project entitled “Crisis Management Foresight”. The goal of the project was to identify trends and show what new dependencies and threats that may arise. The project was also intended to increase knowledge in the business of crisis management and give advice on concrete improvements.

The starting pint for the foresight is the observation that specialisation, economies of scale and outsourcing leads to fragmentation of authority and responsibilities and to a smaller reserve capacity to handle crises.

The tasks for the foresight project were to threefold. First, the project should identify trends in the development of society and highlight what new dependencies and sensitivities for the disturbances that this development can provide. The time horizon was 10-15 years. Second, the project should increase the industry's awareness of societal dependencies and vulnerabilities, and increase their awareness of its role in society crisis management system. Finally, the objective was to identify concrete proposals on how the identified vulnerabilities can be addressed in a future perspective. Furthermore this point also included questions of how to establish better ways of cooperation between the business community, NGOs and the authorities.

And the foresight indeed came up with a number of proposals. Regarding critical infrastructure, it is proposed that one should secure important infrastructure by entering into agreements with the infrastructure owners. Society should also draft a plan for relief logistics, primarily for food and medicines. An increased role of NGOs is foreseen and they should be given responsibilities and resources to act in a crisis. It is further proposed that society organise a widespread information campaign: “in the event of an emergency!” and create a national emergency management portal, www.sos.se.

The Swedish Defence Material Administration runs foresight oriented projects focusing on finding new technologies for existing and future problems of relevance for the national security and the armed forces (FMV 2005). Here, the time perspective is 25 years. The technology fields under study was: complex system, Intelligence and the effect of new information, Protection of the soldier, platforms and facilities, Unmanned systems and miniaturisation.

The project Future risks and security management¹² was conducted by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency in collaboration with the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions in 2007. The exercise gathered over 400 participants from municipalities, regional and central

¹² Framtidens risker och säkerhetsarbete.

authorities, the businesses sector and organizations (The Swedish Rescue Service 2008). The report identifies twelve areas where strategies should be developed, e.g. the need to formulate national targets for safety, strengthen representatives ability to control security in the municipalities and strengthen the individual's ability to own responsibility.

4.2 International foresight activities

Swedish actors have participated in a number of foresight activities on the Nordic arena. In the **Nordic ICT Foresight**¹³ project, launched in May 2005, one of the focal areas were security. The aim of the project was to contribute to the strategic intelligence in the Nordic region so that “the full potential of information and communication technology can be exploited to increase the welfare in the Nordic countries” (Ahlqvist et al. 2007). During the project four external sociotechnical scenarios were created. One of the scenarios, *ICT for Security's Sake*, describes a very security driven development of information and communication technologies. On a general level, the study identified, general confidentiality, security in environments and networks and biometrics as key application areas.

In another Nordic project - the **Nordic Hydrogen Energy Foresight** - the aim was to find long-term promising ways for Nordic stakeholders of exploiting hydrogen in the drive to meet the energy security, economic growth and environmental protection. In the study socio-technical visions for a future hydrogen economy were developed and pathways to commercialization of hydrogen production, distribution, storage and utilization were investigated.¹⁴

On the European level Swedish actors have participated in a number of foresight projects. Between 1996 and 1999, Swedish researchers participated in the so-called **STEEDS** project, founded within EU's 4:th framework programme. The main purposes of the project were to project the market uptake of different transport technologies under various scenarios and policy options and to assess the energy, environmental and other impacts of these different technology mixes (Dreborg et al. 1997). Another project in the 4:th framework programme with Swedish participation was the **POSSUM** project. The main objective of the project was to construct future scenarios for achieving sustainable mobility and to assist in decision-making about the transport policy (Banister et al. 2000). Yet another foresight project was **FANTASIE** aimed at identifying new technologies and lines of technological development expected to affect European transport systems (Korver et al. 1999).

4.3 Identified threats

A common view among the stakeholders is that the threat perception is very much driven by “one threat at a time”. Some years ago it was bird flu and pandemic and now and then it is threats against IT infrastructure that is on the top of the agenda.

There is no shared view among stakeholders as to what defines the vital threats to Swedish safety and security. When compared to the military system there is nothing like a structured process for identification of threats. Nor is there an explicit way of prioritising among identified threats. In reality, this is of course done in more implicit ways. Much of the practical prioritisation is done at the various agencies in the crisis management system.

In the first place, this might be seen as a disadvantage. But some of the interviewees pointed out that this more ad hoc procedure is perhaps not that bad. First we concentrate the whole crisis management system on one kind of threat. Then a lot of research is usually done and the system is developed as to be prepared for meeting this threat. Then comes next threat, perhaps via a

¹³ ICT - Information and Communication Technologies.

¹⁴ See further www.h2foresight.info

media hype or an incident elsewhere, and the process is repeated. If this is repeated on a more or less regular basis, a reasonable range of threats is covered.

In cooperation with a large number of agencies, SEMA is publishing a threat and risk report each year (SEMA 2008). The report for 2008 has not been published yet, but some information is available. A starting point for SEMA's work is that the threats analysed are those that could have implications for all or part of society and call for a cross-sectoral collaboration. The report will, among other things, discuss the following topics:

- Consequences of climate change
- Pandemic
- CBRN
- Terrorism
- Organised crime
- Information security
- Threats against the financial system

The first point is the same issue as the Defence Commission raised in its latest report. The Commission write: "Environmental impact and climate change represent the most serious global threats to people's security" (Defence Commission 2007). There has been a lively discussion over this statement and many commentators argue that this is to exaggerate the impacts from climate change.

IT security is still an important subject. One of the stakeholders said that the attack on Estonia had an impact on the way the Swedish security community thinks about these issues. One of the main problems in IT security is that activities and responsibility is spread out over a number of different actors; public-private and between several governmental agencies.

After a number of years with relaxed relations with Russia, one can now see tendencies that more people are worried over the development. The planned construction of a gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea is an issue that could imply problems in the Swedish-Russian relationships (Larsson 2007b). In Sweden there are concerns over environmental problems in connection with the pipeline.

It has been discussed why the threat from Russia lasted so long in Swedish defence planning. According to Eriksson (2004), the focus on military threats from Russia lasted right up until the spring of 2003, when there was a reversal of the trend: "For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the Defence Commission no longer consider an armed attack threat that should be prioritized. Instead terrorism became the threat that received most attention.

5. European collaboration

Sweden is one of the world's most globalised countries and an integral part of Europe. There is a solid consensus that European collaboration is a necessity for building a more secure Swedish society. Threats are international, so the response must also be international. At the same time as all stakeholders hold EU cooperation as something necessary, this does not mean that the cooperation always are to the better. Sweden's line is often: do not build double structures. Always ask: What is the added value?

The EU and the UN are the key platforms for Sweden's actions internationally in the field of security. The development in Russia can be used to illustrate the importance of European collaboration. The Swedish government underlines that solidarity between the EU states is important in the context of the Russian development.

EU cooperation in the Ministry of Defence's sphere of responsibility mainly relates to the following four areas:

- rescue services and special risks,
- security and defence policy,
- surveillance, supervision and control at sea,
- the defence industry and research.

Several stakeholders pointed out that Sweden must be better to receive help from EU in the event of a crisis. Some of the crises mentioned in chapter 1 - the car ferry MS Estonia, the storm Gudrun and the fire in the night club in Gothenburg - are all examples on crises where there was a need for international assistance.

The advent of a theme dedicated to security within the seventh framework programme (FP7) has in some sense opened up the Swedish soft security research community for international cooperation. Almost all actors in the field - policy makers, funding agencies, research actors - have reacted to this development.

The Swedish Emergency management Agency (SEMA) has underlined the importance of Swedish participation in theme Security of FP7. Participation in international EU funded research will give the opportunity for Swedish research groups to exchange experiences with other groups in Europe which could enhance the development of emergencies and societal security in Sweden according to SEMA. Therefore the agency provide economic support for Swedish research actors who coordinate applications to the security theme. SEMA believes that the role of the coordinator gives unique opportunities for knowledge sharing and it is therefore urgent to increase the number of Swedish players who take the role of coordinator.

Swedish research actors (industry, universities, institutes) have been relatively successful in the first call of theme Security in FP7. Swedish actors received 23 percent of funding they applied for compared to 15 percent which was the average for all applicants. In total Sweden received 7,5 percent¹⁵ of the total funding in call 1 (Eriksson 2008).

A few stakeholders point out that there is a risk in focusing too much on the EU arena. In many areas there already exist bilateral cooperation that is well-functioning. One example is cooperation within transmission of infections.

Some stakeholders also raise the question whether EU initiatives generally are too reactive instead of being proactive. One instrument could be to work with common incentives structures for building robust socioeconomic structures instead of giving support during or after a crisis.

6. Conclusions

Sweden is a safe and open society characterized by trust and cooperation among its citizens. It is also one of the least corrupt societies, according to Transparency International, which also probably add to the feeling of living in a safe part of the world. The Swedish people have high confidence in the criminal justice system but the confidence in the society's capability of managing crises is, however, lower.

Since the end of the cold war there has been a shift in focus from national security to security of the society and the individual. The "national catastrophes" have also added to this shift; the

¹⁵ Of EU's almost 500 million citizens, the Swedish population amounts to less than 2 percent.

murderer of Olof Palme and Anna Lindh, MS Estonia and the Tsunami did not threaten the Kingdom of Sweden, but had a huge influence on society as a whole.

A concept of security in Sweden - if there is *one* - must relate to the relaxation of the recalations with Russian, the national catastrophes and the concept of the "broader threat perspective". Perhaps equally important is to incorporate the distinction between real threats and perceived threats.

The defence industry has for a long time had an substantial impact on Swedish security domain. The role, however, is under transformation. The defence industry want to become less dependent on Swedish Military Forces. This objective is address in two ways. First, the industry works for broaden the market from only (almost) being military to be partly civil. Second, the industry works hard to increase the international share of the revenue. So far, this has been a successful strategy and it will be interesting to follow the projected metamorphosis from a national defence industry into an international security industry.

Sweden is an internationalised country and this has consequences for security in different ways. Swedes travels much abroad, many Swedes work outside the country and the business life if very international. The tsunami highlighted clearly that security is not only homeland security. Sweden takes a very active role in different security related international activities, in ESPD, in the work with the EU crisis management capacities and in the security theme in the seventh framework programme. Sweden believes international co-operation is a prerequisite for addressing today's security challenges.

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Appendix A Current security related activities

Table 1 Organizations

Organisation	Short Description	Contact Information
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Swedish missions abroad and are responsible for Sweden's relations with other countries.	Gustav Adolfs torg 1, 103 39 Stockholm tel. +46840510 00
Ministry of Defense	The Ministry of Defence seeks to fulfil the objectives the Government and Riksdag have set for defence policy, protection and preparedness against accidents and preparedness for severe peacetime emergencies.	Jakobsgatan 9, 103 33 Stockholm tel: +46840510 00
Ministry of Justice	The Ministry of Justice is responsible for legislation concerning the constitution and general administrative law, civil law, procedural law and criminal law. The Ministry also handles matters relating to migration and asylum policy.	Rosenbad 4 103 33 Stockholm tel: +46840510 00
Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)	SEMA coordinates the work to develop the preparedness of Swedish society to manage serious crises. SEMA works together with municipalities, county councils and government authorities, as well as the business community to reduce the vulnerability of society and improve the capacity to handle emergencies.	P.O. Box 599 SE-101 31 Stockholm tel: +4608593 710 00
Swedish Rescue Services Agency	The Swedish Rescue Services Agency is a national authority that is active in many areas of expertise, for example, through preventive methods working towards reducing the number of emergencies and their consequences and thereby making society safer.	651 80 Karlstad tel: +46 54 13 50 00

Table 2 Strategies and doctrines

Strategy	Short Description	Contact Information
Sweden's security policy	In the policy it is stated that the primary goal of Sweden's security policy is to preserve peace and the country's independence. It is further stated that the aim is that Sweden should contribute to stability and security in our neighbourhood and work for strengthen international peace and security.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Statement of Foreign Policy	The Statement of Foreign Policy is presented to the Parliament each year and indicates visions and aims for Sweden's relations to other countries and the world outside Sweden.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cooperation in crisis - for a more secure society	The strategy defines the foundational structure for civil security in Sweden.	Ministry of Defence

Table 3 Private sector

Name of the company	Short Description	Main activities	Contact information
Assa Abloy	Assa Abloy is a global leader in door opening solutions, dedicated to satisfying end-user needs for security, safety and convenience.	Locks, cylinders, security doors and fittings, access control, identification technology, automatic doors and hotel security.	P.O. Box 70340 SE-107 23 Stockholm tel: +468506485 00
BAE Systems Bofors	Bofors is a developer of artillery systems.	Artillery	SE-691 80 Karlskoga tel: +46586733 000
BAE Systems Hägglunds	Hägglunds designs, manufactures and markets military vehicle systems.	The company's primary products are infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), armoured all-terrain vehicles (ATV) and turret systems.	SE-891 82 Örnsköldsvik tel: +46660 800 00
Saab	Saab serves the global market with world-leading products, services and solutions ranging from military defence to civil security.	Aviation, Command & Control systems, Communication, Electronic Warfare, Sensor Systems, Signature Management, Simulation & Training, Space technologies Unmanned Systems, Weapon Systems, Civil Security	P.O Box 703 63 SE-107 24 Stockholm tel: +46 8 463 00 00
Securitas	Securitas' core business is security services, including the main business lines specialized guarding, and mobile and monitoring. Securitas also provides consulting and investigation services.		Lindhagensplan 70 Box 12307 SE-102 28 Stockholm tel: +4610 470 30 00
Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association	The Association is open to companies whose production of security and defence equipment and services constitutes an essential part of their output, as well as to smaller companies, SMEs, some of which with a smaller involvement in the industry.		Box 7724 SE-103 95 Stockholm tel: +468524 630 72

Table 4 Key Technologies

Name of the Technology	Short Description	Applications
CBRN	Protection against chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear (CBRN) incidents.	Countermeasures against CBRN such as e.g. vaccines and antidotes.
Systems engineering		Integrated surveillance and information systems, command and control systems, simulation systems.
Sensor technology	Sensor systems are crucial in providing early warning or monitoring events, and thus helping to control response actions..	Identifying at border controls and for the protection of physical infrastructure; screening for detecting weapons and harmful substances; surveillance of e.g. physical objects; tracking of e.g. goods.
IT security	Cryptology, biometrics, system engineering, hardware solutions,	Protection against viruses, spam and high power microwave weapons; protection against unauthorised access; methods for carrying out risk analyses and developing security strategies.
Information fusion	The field information fusion is concerned with combining information from different sources in order to facilitate understanding or provide knowledge that is not evident from individual sources	Intelligence information processing; Decision support systems.
Nano technology	Engineering at the atomic scale.	Multispektral camouflage; sensors that can see through walls and clothes; protection of eyes against the laser; bionano lab.

Appendix B Identified threats

Table 5 Identified threats

Name	Short Description
Neighbourhood	The development in Russia is of vital importance for Swedish national security.
Climate change	Rising temperatures and increased frequency of extreme natural and weather events such as flooding, can cause widespread hardship in large parts of the socially significant infrastructure such as transport, power supply, telecommunications, IT, water supply and sewage systems.
Viruses and pandemics	Probably, we will continue to suffer from viruses that we have no resistance against. While outbreaks of animal diseases and zoonoses could lead to widespread disruption and limited freedom of movement for people. Resistance to antibiotics of serious bacterial strains and even resistance within the viral disease is a growing problem.
CBRN	The chemical, radiological and nuclear substances are used in many parts of society, such as in industry, research, energy and health care. To minimize the risk of accidents and limit the availability incident is strictly regulated. The growing use increases the risk of accidents and other incidents.
Organised crime	Various forms of organised crime can develop into a serious threat to the fundamental values of Swedish society. It could be the case for elected officials and people in law enforcement functions that are exposed to various forms of threats and pressure.
ICT security	The high dependence on information technology means that information security is essential to the national and global security and the economy. A large disturbance in the information infrastructure can lead to a serious crisis in society. At the same time, operational crisis management depends upon the functioning of information and communication systems