

 **FORESEC** - Europe's evolving security: drivers, trends and scenarios

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Synthesis Report**

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this report is to summarise the findings of the state of the art scan on European security carried out under the “Europe’s evolving security: drivers, trends and scenarios“ (FORESEC) project funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme. The scan aimed to give a state of the art overview on national and European security related activities to avoid gaps and duplication in future work on this project, as well as to provide analysis of the global trends and actors impacting European security. To this end 12 country reports were compiled by members of the project consortium to provide an overview of the internal and external security strategies in the countries chosen. The EU member states have been selected to give a comprehensive overview of the different cultures, geographical locations, national strategies and societal challenges that impact on security. Simultaneously with the country reports a report on global trends and actors shaping European security was written.

The FORESEC state of the art reports will be used as a basis for the forthcoming participatory elements of the project. They will provide critical policy support and advice for security researchers and decision-makers involved in the project with view to helping them achieve the end goals of the FORESEC project: to provide recommendations on foresight and technological research priorities in the medium- to long-term timeframe.

This synthesis report distils key insights and consideration from these 13 documents in four steps. First, it discusses different ‘lenses’ on the issue of security focusing in turn on institutions, strategies, technologies, and societal concerns. Each lens throws open a different perspective on the overarching problem of accounting for an increasingly complex and fragmented issue area, security, and thereby highlights the need for a comprehensive conception of security. Second, the report underlines the similarities and discrepancies found in the countries studies regarding threat perceptions in order to raise awareness of varying historical and geographical contexts. Third, it explores the potential for increased cooperation among EU member states. Finally, it offers some preliminary conclusions and findings that will provide food for debate during the process.

2. Approaches to security

Security is a multi-faceted term. It is employed in a bewildering range of contexts and for multiple purposes. In part, the concept of security has evolved thus as a result of the new geopolitical developments in Europe. While security has traditionally been considered as being solely related to the use of military force, however, in recent years alternative understandings of security in global and European contexts have gained ground. It is now increasingly argued and accepted that security is something else than, or something in addition to, (something more than) military force. Many argue that the concept of security should be ‘enlarged’, employing concepts such as ‘comprehensive security’, ‘human security’, ‘soft power’ and ‘soft security’ to accommodate concerns of citizens in the current security environment.

Approaches to security are still fragmented across EU member states and the FORESEC country reports highlight the very different conceptions of security and raise awareness of the varying historical and geographic determinants at play. Geography, for example, in the sense of proximity means that Russia remains a main security concern for countries like Poland or Finland. Having repeatedly been the object and location of armed aggression makes territorial defence in the traditional sense a central and structuring element of Polish security whereas, for example, France, Germany and the UK have chosen a different balance in responding to events that would have a high impact but also have a low probability of happening (such as the territorial defence case). At the same time, geography can have a different impact, with fears over migration fluctuating in their intensity depending on proximity to sources of migrants.

Another important difference is that some EU member states have only recently completed the process of institution building and promulgating major strategies in the security field. Relatively recent independence, for example in Estonia and Slovenia, linked to the massive societal, economic and political transformations all former “Eastern bloc” countries had to tackle imply that some elements – be it in the fields of strategy, institutions, instruments, or technology – are not yet fully developed.

The concept of “total defence” plays an important role in many Nordic countries. It implies that security is the joint responsibility of all sectors of society crossing and linking civilian and military actors and public and private realms. In the country reports Estonia, Finland and Sweden are influenced by this idea and the resulting embedded reflex for coordination and inclusion of civil society in discussions about security policy.

Clearly, there is growing recognition and awareness of the rapidly increasing complexity in the security field. The blurring of internal and external security and the need for much greater comprehensiveness in security policy is an oft repeated mantra throughout these reports. As a Swedish stakeholder argued, countries are moving from “security policy to a policy for security.” Some countries have taken to examining security through different levels of analysis ranging from the individual to society to the state with different strategies for each which further increases coordination pressures. While there is an increased focus on the citizen as the object of security, governments are trying to create policy that is more joined-up in the sense of creating output that is the result of an interagency process involving a wide range of – or even all – cabinet ministries and actors from the private sector and civil society. For example, France, Germany, and the UK have all adopted major security policy strategies and white books over the course of the last two years which centre on comprehensive or networked security policy.

There is thus increasing complexity both in terms of the threat and attempts to deal with it through better and more wide-ranging coordination. Cooperation is therefore both more necessary and more difficult. While progress is undeniable, success is so far limited not least because fragmentation also stems from a number of distinct lenses through which security can be analyzed. This section will briefly review conceptions of security from the distinct angles of institutions, strategies, technology, and societies. Each of these lenses generates different insights and thus underlines the need for a comprehensive and overarching concept of security.

Institutions: Stretched by Complexity

In all countries a basic division of labour exists according to which different ministries and other agencies are primarily responsible for different strands of security. For example, ministries of interior will most likely take the lead on counterterrorism and issues related to everyday security whereas the security of critical national infrastructure might fall under the remit of transport ministries whereas military matters are dealt with by civilian-led ministries of defence. The institutional landscape does thus suggest an issue specific approach to security which is at odds with the multiple links between the myriad security risks, challenges and threats and the resulting complexity. The FORESEC country reports have demonstrated that in light of the evolving security environment and the increasing need for interagency processes and all-of-government coordination, this institutional division of labour does no longer adequately address the needs of modern security policy. Some of the country reports have explicitly singled out the relative independence of ministries as obstacles for more effective coordination.

Governments in EU member states have begun to work on solutions to this institutional deficit. For example, the Swedish government has tried to respond to a perceived underperformance of its emergency management system by reorganizing the institutions involved. A new body, the Authority for the Protection of Society and Preparedness will coordinate across different levels (central, regional, municipal) as well as across institutions. A previous body charged with

interagency emergency coordination, located within the ministry of defence, will cease to exist. A new national crisis management centre within the Prime Minister's office will, among other things, provide an overarching threat assessment and also monitor the capabilities of different ministries to deal with complex serious emergencies. In Finland, as well, the Prime Minister's office is emerging as a clearing house for information on emergency and disaster response. Its relevant personnel run meetings involving the heads of preparedness of other ministries and will provide decision-shaping and decision-making information in times of emergency to other agencies.

Counterterrorism is another area, aside from emergency and disaster consequence management, that created significant institutional strain because of the needs for coordination among different actors. In the UK, for example, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), created in 2003, brings together experts from no less than 16 government departments to assess intelligence pertaining to terrorism in the UK. Germany created a similar body in 2004 with the *Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum* (GTAZ, Joint Counterterrorism Centre) located within the ministry of interior but also involving staff from a wide variety of government agencies. France, in its defence and security white paper launched in June 2008, also announced considerable organizational changes which mostly aim to strengthen, and in some cases create, a resilient interagency process for security that avoids institutional stove piping. For example, France will create a National Security Council and a National Intelligence Council to reflect its shift in strategy.

Strategies: Expanding in Scope

To a degree the institutional need for greater interagency coordination is reflected in recent security policy documents adopted by EU member state governments. While not all member states have yet adopted dedicated national security strategies (NSS), there is a shift towards them, with for example, the UK launching its first NSS in March 2008 aiming to provide a single strategy to incorporate objectives and plans for all departments and agencies involved in security. While not called NSS, France and Germany adopted security and defence white papers that set out policies agreed by all cabinet-level ministries in 2008 and 2006 respectively. While there is also an increasing trend to focus on the protection and the security of the individuals (rather than the state), these trends are not yet uniformly anchored in member states' strategies. In some cases, base-line policy documents are still driven by rather narrow institutional perspectives creating the abovementioned coordination problems.

Several government, for example Germany and Poland, make explicit references to the overarching frameworks of the EU and NATO and respective strategies and concepts adopted at that multinational level. Of course, for non-aligned EU members such as Austria Finland or Sweden, NATO amounts to less of a reference point.

At a lower level in terms of the hierarchy of documents, governments have different holes to fill. For example, Poland has identified a pressing need for a strategy for the protection of critical national infrastructure. Estonia, on the other hand, is seeking to develop full blown guidance on the internal dimension of security overall.

Swedish strategy discusses different levels of analysis ranging from the international, to society, to the individual and in conclusion stresses the need to protect the security of society at large. Italy has recently witnessed a softening of a state-centred approach and is increasingly stressing the individual as the referent object of security policy. In Finland different sub-strategies exist that all view the problems at hand through a distinct institutional lens. Institutional ownership in these cases drives the analysis and policy implications. While these strategies may have found a common denominator in their focus on societal and individual security, their parallel existence actually increases the coordination challenge. Furthermore, the revision and updating of sub-strategies is usually not synchronised which amounts to a wasted opportunity to reap synergy benefits.

The review of government strategies in the FORESEC country reports underlines that a common picture has yet to emerge. Most governments stress the diffuse and complex nature of the threat, the blurring of internal and external security driven by interlinked, asymmetric and de-territorialized challenges involving a multitude of actors (including non-state entities). However, EU member state governments do not have a comparable set of strategies in place across the board. The level of detail, institutional ownership (and the importance of it for the analysis entailed in those documents) and level of analysis favoured does vary. Thus, while important trends such as an increasing overlap of threat assessment, the perceived need for greater cooperation, and an increasing focus on the individual (human security) are visible, below the EU level we cannot yet witness a coherent treatment of the issues at hand.

Technology and Industry: Where One Stands Depends on Where One Sits

Several EU member states, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom boast a strong defence industrial base and some countries have developed a particular focus on high technology. Focus on internal security and crisis management has created demand for security technologies and in many countries; traditional defence industry actors are seeking new customers from civilian authorities. On the other hand, the development of key technologies relating to security are still heavily influenced by the industry as it has been challenging to involve the user organisations to the priority setting activities in national and European level research programmes.

The defence and security market operates within different parameters than other fields of economic activity. For example, defence suppliers contract with governments. This means there is a very small set of ultimate customers. As a result, suppliers have a very narrow range of funding sources, and their business is completely dependent on decisions taken by a few clients (governments). Decisions to place business with defence companies generally take into account more than the usual commercial considerations to include the preservation of jobs or the development of a particular area of technology. An additional distorting factor is the practice of 'offset', in which export customers expect suppliers, as a condition of winning orders, to provide industrial benefits, such as the commitment to invest in the contracting country's industries. These benefits can go well beyond the world of defence. Furthermore, because of a growing overlap of the requirements presented by homeland security and defence and the rising importance of information technology, traditional suppliers of defence equipment are increasingly operating alongside businesses from other sectors in an increasingly complex security market.

In any event, the existence of a significant defence industrial base can be expected to influence the definition of technology priorities by governments. On the other hand, the shift from the much shielded defence market with high entry barriers to a more open security market together with moves by European companies to position themselves in overseas markets undermines the traditional concept of the defence industrial base as being 'national'.

The FORESEC country reports produced different results in terms of the relationship between industry as a provider of technology-based solutions and government. For example, in Finland the ability of industry to actively shape technology priorities of the government was assessed to be high. In Italy, a key finding indicates that different government agencies define technology needs through relatively constrained institutional visions in the absence of overarching guidance. The report on France on the other hand highlights the central role the *Délégation Générale pour l'Armement* (DGA), and thus the government, plays in shaping defence industry. In Poland, many of the businesses in this sector remain mostly state-owned.

As described above, nowadays security research and technology priorities are mainly defined in collaboration between defence industry and governments. On the other hand, the shift from a state centred security concept towards a comprehensive and citizen centred security concept,

acknowledged in the national strategies, should also be emphasized in the assessment of S&T priorities and allocation of R&D funds. The emergence of the security market implies a shifting relationship between civilian and military research and as the country reports suggest, the boundaries are lowering and it is likely that the civilian sector will become the main innovator with new technologies being spun into the military field rather than the other way around. Moreover, for the individual citizen, the changes and overlaps that are taking place in the sphere of internal and external security threats might mean an increase in privately produced security. These changes, however, are not fully acknowledged in the national and international research programmes; the Finnish security technology programme run by Finnish Funding Agency of Technology and Innovation (TEKES), for example, aims to improve the competitiveness of Finnish industry and create access to international markets, not to improve citizens' security as such

Societies: Low Threat Perception

In general, the FORESEC reports show that societies in EU member states feel relatively safe and do not perceive international security challenges to be among their priority concerns. There are important distinctions to be made in this regard. When asked whether certain issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation or the rise of new powers such as China might represent a security risk a high percentage of EU citizens will say 'yes'. However, if then asked whether they will be directly affected by these challenges the number goes down and when asked about their personal priority concerns these challenges drop to single digits in most cases. On a day-to-day basis, European citizens are much more worried about unemployment, crime, education and the welfare system in general than they are about the key security threats outlined in national strategies and EU security strategy. At the same time, public support for a stronger role of the EU in security policy remains high. However, given the lack of in-depth understanding of major security policy decisions and the general absence of a traditional threat perception focused on key external security risks this support for a stronger a EU role should not be misinterpreted. It would be more accurate to characterise it as benign neglect rather than an active interest.

This insight is further underlined by the strong impact that current events have on public perceptions and opinion. For example, the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 had a strong influence on how parts of the population view security challenges. In Sweden, the governments perceived under performance in several emergency management situations left a lasting impression in the electorates mind. In Italy, individual cases have focused public attention on the alleged link between immigration and crime. In the United Kingdom, a debate has ensued about the balance between counter-terrorism legislation and civil liberties whereas in Finland, in the absence of a perceived pressing threat, social marginalisation has become a major security concern.

This implies that 'security' as a concept in public opinion does not exist as such. In some countries security is mostly about safety, in others about economic security. In public opinion security seems to be much more about the freedom from want than it is about the freedom from fear.

3. Trends and Threats in Context

Very broadly speaking, the major threats and trends across the European states surveyed in this report are somewhat similar, however, there are clear nuances in public perceptions and the emphasis placed upon different threats. The headings capture the main threats that came up repeatedly, with a combination of state based and transnational threats observed across the continent. One very broad trend seemed to be the elevated sense of risk from other states amongst larger EU members, while smaller members focused on transnational threats and then framed their responses through an EU framework.

Naturally, one of the key determinants of a state's perception of security is founded in its history – something reflected in Europe in the divide between the states that were behind the Soviet side of the Iron curtain and those not. Those formerly under Soviet rule mostly warmly welcomed NATO membership and have an outlook that reflects a sense of genuine threat from Russia, they also have a tendency to be more open to transatlantic notions of international security threats. However, Eastern concerns are not the only historical characteristic in European security perceptions –the German and Austrian experience during the World Wars has ingrained pacifism and a keenness to rely on multinational institutions, while the Spanish experience under Franco has resulted in a deep resistance to the militarization of domestic security concerns.

Increasing and unpredictable influence of global actors

While many of the reports expressed some concern about Russia as an unpredictable energy supplier, there were interesting nuances to the statements of concern across the member states. Those nearest Russia are burdened with an unfortunate historical baggage that tends to heighten their concerns, but at the same time, this has evolved from earlier concerns to a fear towards Russian internal stability and its potentially negative impact on them (this concern is even deeper amongst those who remain physically vulnerable to woefully underinvested Russian infrastructure).

The two other geographical regions which were high on the list of threats amongst member states covered (but it is worth highlighting that these concerns was mostly amongst the “big 3” capitals, with some expressions elsewhere as well, but in a more limited manner) – were China and the Middle East. China is seen primarily as a challenge laden with potential benefits, though there are underlying tensions that were mentioned, including China's deep in-roads into Africa which while not necessarily at odds with European aims, could serve to undermine European efforts on the continent. Finally both Russia and China were seen as threats towards cyber-infrastructure and policy makers in both Paris and London expressed some concern about increased Chinese and Russian espionage efforts.

The final regional issue that came up repeatedly was the Middle East, where amongst the “big 3” Iran was seen as a major regional threat, both directly, but also as a destabilizing factor. A greater and more public sort of threat was felt towards the broader region as a potential source of terrorism, but also as a source of socially problematic immigration.

Economics

Broadly reflecting the basic sense of security in Europe, Eurobarometer and other polls cited throughout reports in this series showed citizens primarily concerned with inflation and rising prices as their biggest fears. The potential risks posed by economic volatility and weakened markets to individual prosperity and sense of security was regularly amongst the top concerns. This was true primarily in smaller member states where terrorism was seen as less of a concern, but was also reflected in bigger member states. A subset of this threat perception was the fear of increased income disparity and the growing stratification of society and the frictions this may cause – this was seen both at an internal state level, but also transnationally, with income disparities across borders seen as impacting migratory patterns.

Organized crime

After economics, organized crime remained the most oft cited threat – with a highly elevated sense of concern amongst citizens and governments alike as to the threat posed from organized crime. This was seen from the perspective of drugs trafficking, human smuggling, fraud, and in some states as having almost completely undermined central government (Italy and Bulgaria distinguish themselves particularly in this regard and this is reflected in their threat perceptions).

Terrorism

After organized crime, transnational terrorist networks were broadly seen as the next most immediate hard security threat. However, while almost all strategic documents and outlooks list it

as a major threat, at a public level, the actual sense of threat is relatively low. While this is not true in the United Kingdom and Germany where the sense of fear from terrorism remains elevated, for many smaller states terrorism was very low on the public risk register. This sense is best exemplified by Swedes, who fear terrorism when they are travelling abroad, but not at home. For those thinkers concerned about terrorism (mostly in the big 3, Italy and Spain), there was an additional geographical element to the threat perception – with most seeing a clear threat emanating from North Africa.

Energy

In many cases, energy security was seen broadly under the framework of Russia, as listed above. However, for some it was inextricably linked to the climate change issue as well, and the growing sense that some return towards nuclear energy might be required.

Cyber-threats

With an increasing dependence on computer and electronic telecommunications systems, the potential risk posed to them by state assault or non-state actors was raised in a number of states. Amongst states that have particularly high levels of investment in their cyber-infrastructure, like Nordic and Baltic states, this was a particular concern – however, it registered very high on the risk registers amongst larger member states as well, and it is likely to increase as other states electronic development increases.

Infrastructure

There was a common concern across member states about the increasing vulnerability of infrastructure, this extended from cyber-infrastructure to pipelines, transport links, and energy infrastructure more general. This was seen as a particular internal threat in states like the United Kingdom, but the lack of effective connectivity amongst European states more generally was seen as a potential weakness. Swedes for example, expressed a great sense of concern at potential cascading effects from bad infrastructure in neighbouring states they relied upon for trade and raw materials.

Natural Disasters

This very broad heading encompasses climate change, pandemic diseases, and other natural disasters like flooding or earthquakes. Broadly speaking, all of these were listed as high concerns of policymakers, and to a lesser degree the publics. While there has of late been an increased amount of concern about the potential risk from such natural disasters, there is little understanding or ability to quantify the exact threat – though there is a broad sense that government's need to be effectively prepared to deal with the threat. However, apocalyptic scenarios and speculations have apparently somewhat detached this from citizen's immediate lists of concerns.

Immigration

The reasons for mass immigration are captured in a number of the other threats listed above. However, European citizens' concerns about them span everything from the potential terrorist menace that might follow; to major social disparities and frictions; to a more mundane fear of elevated criminality. However, given demographic trends (which interestingly were only registered as concerns in Bulgaria and Italy), and environmental degradation in neighbouring regions like North Africa, this was likely to remain a major concern for the near and long-term future.

4. Security research and foresight at national level

Security research is to a great extent conducted from the perspective of state security or defence. It is interesting to note that security research encompassing the more recent broader concept of the word and more traditional "hard" military research are moving closer together. As this broadened concept of security as a field of research is growing in importance, it is increasing

dramatically and there is considerable potential for new and innovative research efforts across the board. Several European countries have established particular security research programmes beyond traditional military research with a special focus on security technologies. There are efforts to coordinate between national and European level security research programmes but so far it has not been adequate and both gaps and duplication does occur. The security industry often plays a major role both at national and at European level in formulating security research priorities, something that can be slightly problematic, as securing citizens and what markets perceive as financially remunerative areas might require different priorities.

Security related foresight work is mainly carried out, at a national level, by the Ministry of Defence, often in connection with the development of national security strategies. Consequently, related scenarios often naturally focus on more traditional perceptions of national defence. In some cases the scenarios remain classified and beyond public reach. At the same time, other non-classified efforts are regularly occurring elsewhere, either within the broader security apparatus, or in the public and non-governmental sectors. The field of foresight activities at national level is thusly highly fragmented and lacks coordination, making it a considerable challenge to effectively disseminate the results of the foresight activities effectively in order for them to have an impact on decision-making.

5. European Level Collaboration

The state of the art scan tried also to identify areas of security research which were perceived to be ones in which there would be some added value from greater European level collaboration. Amongst smaller European countries the value and importance of greater cooperation in such research at a European level is significant, whereas bigger countries have the finances to take a more selective approach that will naturally prefer to address areas defined national interests and challenges. However, there was a wide recognition that as the majority of the trends and threats is transnational, and thusly requires multilateral responses making the EU a major player in addressing them. In terms of priorities for security research the added value exists both in pooling resources, but also in understanding in a comprehensive manner the societal and human dynamics of security as well as in technological responses across Europe. Cross-border technological investment in Europe was broadly seen through two prisms: on the one hand technologies that reflected Europe's deepening integration, while on the other, high investment technologies that individual member states would have difficultly affording by themselves.

Radicalisation and marginalisation

Societal trends such as radicalisation and marginalisation require further research at the correct level as different countries are at different stages regarding this issue (both at the conceptual and action level). The research conducted on marginalisation and radicalisation at European level should correspond to the multiple realities in the different European societies.

Standardized Risk/Crisis Management

As evidenced by the wide array of different threat perceptions and reactions to risk presented in this report, with parallel deepening of European integration, there is a clear need for greater investment in establishing a common set of best practice and tools to manage crisis effectively.

Improving Citizen Awareness of threats

Potentially connected to a more effective exploitation of online tools, a more rapid citizen awareness network was mentioned a number of times as a tool that could benefit from European investment, and raise Europe's credibility and reason in citizen's eyes.

Better Understanding of What Russia wants

This could largely seem an academic exercise outside the technological realm, however, the concern with which many Europeans view Russia and the lack of a coherent policy towards the nation upon which it is so highly dependent, presents a potentially toxic combination from Europe. Some investment in academic research and the development of a coherent European strategy was cited as a crucial.

Borders

There was a sense amongst Eastern border states surveyed that greater investment was required in improving border security – however, this was an issue that came up amongst others as well. Improving border checks and strengthening Europe's borders was seen as key in countering transnational terrorism and organized crime.

Critical National Infrastructure

Greater coordination was seen as essential in protecting critical national infrastructure, both in cyber and solid – given Europe's increasingly integrated nature, this was seen as a growing gap in European capabilities.

Improving European-level cross border Counter-terror and organized crime efforts

Almost a subset of the aforementioned concern, the particularly transborder nature of the threat posed by international terrorism and organized crime is something that would benefit from greater European coordination. One specific technology cited that would help with this is open source technology.

Common airspace technologies

Given the increasing openness of European skies, and the growing number of planes flying through common airspaces, the risk of accidents or misunderstandings is elevated. Increasing investment in common airspace technologies will increase safety, but will also lead to a greater protection from outside airborne threats.

Space-based defence

Greater investment in space-based technologies, either intelligence assets or defensive tools providing a platform for anti-missile technologies were seen as a crucial asset that Europe should invest in. It is worth highlighting that this was seen as a commercial and defence benefit, with an ideal scenario involving some blend of the two. Naturally, this was something that was heard more frequently in Paris and London.

Guided Weapons technology

Increasingly precise and effective weapons were seen as a key point of investment in states with large armies – those with smaller militaries and defence budgets were not focused on such big-ticket items.

Environmental technologies

Europe is already seen as a leader in environmental technologies, further investment in this field may give Europe an added advantage as the rest of the world increasingly turns to such technologies. Desalination technologies, climate change technologies in adaptation and preservation terms, and protective measures to mitigate the results of climate change.

Energy

Investment in the European energy sector should be driven along a number of crucial strands: the establishment of a Center for Excellence for energy studies; the better development of carbon capture technologies; improving buildings energy efficiency; as well as better investment and exploitation of renewable energy sources, including greater investment in nuclear energy.

6. Conclusion

EU member states' governments do not have a comparable set of security strategies or priorities in place across the board to address adequately the current security challenges Europe faces. The review of government strategies in the FORESEC country reports underlines that a common picture has yet to emerge. The level of detail, institutional ownership (and the importance of it for the analysis entailed in those documents) and level of analysis favoured varies widely, in part due to geographical and historical contexts.

However, the scan observes an increasing overlap of threat assessment in different EU member states. **The major threats and trends across the European state surveyed in this report are somewhat similar, however, there are clear nuances in public and government perceptions and the emphasis placed upon different threats.** Most governments stress the diffuse and complex nature of the threat, the blurring of internal and external security driven by interlinked, asymmetric and de-territorialized challenges involving a multitude of actors (including non-state entities).

Maintaining European security is complex and requires a comprehensive approach both at national and European level. Governments are trying to create a more joined-up policy resulting from an interagency process involving a wide range of – or even all – cabinet ministries and actors from the private sector and civil society. While progress is undeniable, success is so far limited not the least because fragmentation also stems from a number of distinct lenses through which security can be analyzed within member states. Because of these different approaches there seems to be a lack of understanding of the linkages of technological and societal issues, and there is a clear need to better link security research to the overall strategies and policies contributing to European security.

National security research and foresight activities are not adequately coordinated with the European level research programmes resulting in gaps and overlap between activities.

The security industry often plays a major role both at national and at European level in formulating security research priorities. This can be slightly problematic, as securing citizens and what markets perceive as financially remunerative areas might require different priorities. Concerning European level collaboration, member states have an interest and see an added value in cooperating on issues such as border security, addressing radicalisation, and organised crime and on developing security technologies that are effective in countering the key threats.

There is an increased focus on the citizen as the object of security. The European Security Strategy and many national policy documents have now focused on the individual in acknowledgement of the concept of human security which puts the premium on this level. Threat assessments also highlight that, for the foreseeable future, threats to EU member states will not jeopardize their existential security making the shift to human security somewhat easier. The individual should thus be at the centre.

There is increasing debate about whose responsibility the provision of security is. This has traditionally understood to be the domain of the state and national governments. However, at a time when, for example, critical infrastructure is owned mostly by private companies, this conception is too narrow and it becomes harder to allocate absolute responsibility upon private actors or necessarily dictate how they will respond in a crisis situation. In resilience terms and terms of preparedness, ownership extends even beyond the private sector to the individual. Security has thus become the joint responsibility of the state and society at large including the private sector.

Finally, security was traditionally about survival. In today's context it would be possible to define the scope of security to be to protect the lives of individuals. However, while already a shift from the traditional concept of state survival, it might be suggested that security is about more than survival or freedom from fear. It is also about well-being in a more general sense as evidenced, for example, by the frequent references to different aspects of economic security in the country reports. On the other hand, such a move might stretch the concept too far.

It is therefore suggested that **a working definition of a European concept of security** might be as follows: security refers to the ability and efforts of all sectors of society (individual and private) and government (the state) to protect individuals within the EU and infrastructure from threats and hazards that might endanger their survival.

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