

 **FORESEC - Europe's evolving security: drivers, trends and scenarios**

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Synthesis Report**

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## 1. Introduction

The purpose of this report is to summarise the findings of the scan on European security and foresight activity carried out under the “Europe’s evolving security: drivers, trends and scenarios” (FORESEC) project funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme. The scan aimed to give an overview of national and European security related activities to avoid gaps and duplication in future work on this project, as well as to provide analysis of the global trends and actors impacting European security. To this end 12 country reports were compiled by members of the project consortium to provide an overview of security related strategies, institutions, research activities, security and defence industry, and public opinion issues in the countries chosen. The EU member states included have been selected to cover a broad spectrum of different political cultures, geographical locations, national strategies and societal challenges that impact on security. Simultaneously to the country reports a report covering global trends and actors shaping European security was also written.

The FORESEC country reports will be used as a basis for the forthcoming participatory elements of the project. They will provide critical policy support and advice for security researchers and decision-makers involved in the project with a view to helping them achieve the end goals of the FORESEC project: to provide recommendations on European foresight and technological research priorities in the medium- to long-term timeframe. Drafts of the country reports were drawn up according to a common template and were commented on by other consortium members. They are in part based on interviews with stakeholders. It should be noted however, that within this common framework each country report will also reflect the priorities the consortium partners in charge of them respectively felt necessary to stress to allow for differences in context and perception. Furthermore, while the stakeholder group in each country was invited with a similar balance of actors involved, their real world composition varies from country to country as well which may have had an effect on the information gathered and the analysis conducted.

This synthesis report, first, discusses different ‘lenses’ on the issue of security focusing in turn on institutions, strategies, technologies, and societal concerns (reflected in public opinion polls). Each lens throws open a different perspective on the overarching problem of accounting for an increasingly complex and fragmented issue area, security, and thereby highlights the need for a comprehensive conception of security. Second, the report underlines the similarities and discrepancies found in the country studies regarding threat perceptions in order to raise awareness of varying historical and geographical contexts bearing in mind that the synthesis report cannot rehearse all encountered nuance and differences in detail. As was pointed out during the FORESEC kick-off workshop by a group of stakeholders, in order to enhance cooperation, collaboration and communication in the security field, the project should seek to enhance shared awareness and shared solutions while allowing for cultural differences and diversity of perceptions. Third, the synthesis report explores the potential for increased cooperation among EU member states. Finally, it offers some preliminary conclusions.

Security was traditionally about the survival of the state in a world full of state-based menaces like the nuclear armed Soviet Union. In today’s very different context it would be possible to define the scope of security to be to protect the lives of individuals and society in general. However, it might also be suggested that security is about more than survival or freedom from fear. It is also about well-being in a more general sense as evidenced, for example, by the frequent references to different aspects of economic security in the country reports. On the other hand, such a move might stretch the concept too far and presents some potential problems when incorporating the still-critical role played by traditional security providers.

During the FORESEC kick-off workshop some participants argued that there is no such thing as “European security” because local threat perceptions were too different. Others maintained a common definition would be necessary even though it would be imperfect. At least, so the

argument, there would be a working definition that stakeholders can refer to even if they do not necessarily agree with all of its elements. It is therefore suggested that a working definition of a European concept of security might be as follows: security refers to the ability and efforts of all sectors of society (individual and private) and government (the state) to protect EU societies and citizens from threats, risks and hazards, be they external or internal, man-made or natural, that might endanger their survival.

## 2. Approaches to security

Security is a multi-faceted term. It is employed in a bewildering range of contexts and for multiple purposes. In part, the concept of security has evolved as a result of the new geopolitical developments in Europe and the world. While security has traditionally been considered as being solely related to the use of military force, alternative understandings of security in global and European contexts have gained currency. It is now argued and accepted that security is covered by something more than, or in addition to, military force. Many argue that in the interlinked and globalized world that we now inhabit, the concept of security needs to be enlarged to employ concepts such as 'comprehensive security', 'human security', 'soft power' and 'soft security' to accommodate the concerns of citizens and the duty of governments in the current security environment.

A controversial issue in this regard is the question of how to conceive security on two key dimensions, those of external versus internal security on the one hand and that of civilian and military instruments on the other. The work programme for Framework Programme 7 stresses that it is a civil and not a defence oriented programme. This division is difficult to maintain, in particular in light of the clear move towards all-of-government strategies emerging in several EU member states, among them the biggest three, France, Germany and the UK, and the EU's own ambition to be a truly integrated and comprehensive actor, for example in the field of crisis management. Dealing with some of the most pressing security issues requires civilian and military instruments to be applied in conjunction and in mutual support of each other.

It should also be noted that some participants at the FORESEC workshop argued internal and external security dimensions should not be mixed in the project because the latter would invariably involve military aspects. However, such a constructed delineation seems no longer feasible. One of the widely accepted insights of recent security research is the cross-border and transnational nature of many security challenges. Particularly in a forward-looking project current institutional remits are unlikely to make for good guidance on defining the boundaries of future needs.

Approaches to security are still fragmented across EU member states and the FORESEC country reports highlight the very different conceptions of security across the Union and raise awareness of the varying historical and geographic determinants at play. Geography, for example, reflected in the sense of proximity, means that Russia remains a main security concern for countries like Poland or Finland. Having repeatedly been the object and location of armed aggression makes territorial defence in the traditional sense a central and structuring element of Polish security whereas, for example, France, Germany and the UK have chosen a different balance in responding to events that would have a high impact but also have a low probability of happening (such as the territorial defence case). At the same time, geography can have a different impact, with fears over migration fluctuating in their intensity depending on proximity to traditional sources of migrants.

Another important difference is that some EU member states have only recently completed the process of institution building and promulgating major security documents (such as security strategies or defence white papers). Relatively recent independence, for example in Estonia and Slovenia, linked to the massive societal, economic and political transformations confronted by all

former “Eastern bloc” countries imply that some elements – be it in the fields of strategy, institutions, instruments, or technology – are not yet fully developed.

The concept of “total defence” plays an important role in many Nordic countries’ security thinking. It implies that security is the joint responsibility of all sectors of society crossing and linking civilian and military, and public and private realms. In the country reports Estonia, Finland and Sweden are influenced by this idea and the resulting embedded reflex for coordination and inclusion of civil society in discussions about security policy, which has a natural reflection on how security is therefore conceptualized.

Clearly, there is growing recognition and awareness of the rapidly increasing complexity in the security field. The blurring of internal and external security and the need for much greater comprehensiveness in security policy is an oft repeated mantra throughout these reports. As a Swedish stakeholder argued, countries are moving from “security policy to a policy for security.” Some countries have taken to examining security through different levels of analysis: ranging from the individual, to society, to the state, with different strategies for each – increasing coordination pressures. While there is an increased focus on the citizen as the object of security, governments are trying to create policy that is more joined-up in the sense of creating output that is the result of an interagency process involving a wide range of – or even all – cabinet ministries and actors from the private sector and civil society. For example, France, Germany, and the UK have all adopted major security policy strategies and white books over the course of the last two years which centre on the idea of comprehensive or networked security policy.

There is thus increasing complexity both in terms of the threat and attempts to deal with it through better and more wide-ranging coordination. Cooperation is therefore both more necessary and more difficult. While progress is undeniable, success is so far limited not least because fragmentation also stems from a number of distinct lenses through which security can be analyzed. This section will briefly review conceptions of security from the distinct angles of institutions, strategies, technology, and societies. Each of these lenses generates different insights, and states place diverging priorities upon them, underlining the need for a comprehensive and overarching concept of security.

### **Institutions: Stretched by Complexity**

In all countries a basic division of labour exists according to which different ministries and other agencies are primarily responsible for different strands of security. For example: ministries of interior will most likely take the lead on counterterrorism and issues related to everyday security; critical national infrastructure security is more likely to fall under the remit of transport ministries; and military matters remain the purview of civilian-led ministries of defence. The institutional landscape does thus suggest an issue specific approach to security which is at odds with the multiple links between the myriad security risks, challenges and threats that nations currently face. The FORESEC country reports have demonstrated that in light of the evolving security environment and the increasing need for interagency processes and all-of-government coordination, this institutional division of labour does no longer adequately address the needs of modern security policy. Some of the country reports have explicitly singled out the tendency towards independence of specific ministries as obstacles for necessary and effective coordination.

Governments in EU member states have begun to work on solutions to this institutional deficit. For example, the Swedish government has tried to respond to a perceived underperformance of its emergency management system by reorganizing the institutions involved. A new body, the Authority for the Protection of Society and Preparedness will coordinate across different levels (central, regional, municipal) as well as across institutions. A previous body charged with interagency emergency coordination, located within the ministry of defence, will cease to exist. A new national crisis management centre within the Prime Minister’s office will, among other things,

provide an overarching threat assessment and also monitor the capabilities of different ministries to deal with complex serious emergencies. In Finland, as well, the Prime Minister's office is emerging as a clearing house for information on emergency and disaster response. Its relevant personnel run meetings involving the heads of preparedness of other ministries and will provide decision-shaping and decision-making information in times of emergency to other agencies.

Counterterrorism is another area, aside from emergency and disaster consequence management, that created significant institutional strain because of the needs for coordination among different actors. In the UK, for example, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), created in 2003, brings together experts from no less than 16 government departments and agencies to assess intelligence pertaining to terrorism in the UK. Germany created a similar body in 2004 with the Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ, Joint Counterterrorism Centre) located within the ministry of interior but also involving staff from a wide variety of government agencies. France, in its defence and security white paper launched in June 2008, also announced considerable organizational changes which mostly aim to strengthen, and in some cases create, a resilient interagency process for security that avoids institutional stove piping. For example, France will create a National Security Council and a National Intelligence Council to reflect its refocused strategy.

### **Strategies: Expanding in Scope**

To a degree the institutional need for greater interagency coordination is reflected in recent security policy documents adopted by EU member state governments. While not all member states have yet adopted dedicated national security strategies (NSS) there is a shift towards them, with, for example, the UK launching its first NSS in March 2008 aiming to provide a single strategy to incorporate objectives and plans for all departments and agencies involved in security. France and Germany adopted security and defence white papers that set out policies agreed by all cabinet-level ministries in 2008 and 2006 respectively. There is also an increasing trend amongst certain states to focus on the protection and the security of the individual citizen (rather than the state), trends that are not yet, however, uniformly anchored in member states' strategies. In some cases, base-line policy documents are still driven by rather narrow institutional perspectives creating the abovementioned coordination problems.

Several governments, for example Germany and Poland, make explicit references to the overarching frameworks of the EU and NATO and respective strategies and concepts adopted at that multinational level. Of course, for non-aligned EU members such as Austria Finland or Sweden, NATO amounts to less of a reference point. Some participants in the FORESEC kick-off workshop pointed out that discussion and analysis of European security has to be embedded in or at the very least relate to the transatlantic framework embodied by NATO of which 21 of the currently 27 EU member states are a member. Others suggested that NATO might be an obstacle for generating new and non-traditional approaches to security. Harking back to the points made above about the blurring of internal and external security and civilian and military means it again seems prudent to not create artificial boundaries that do not reflect the reality of security policy in the majority of EU member states who are also members of NATO.

At a lower level in the documentary hierarchy, different governments find they have different holes to fill: for example, Poland has indentified a pressing need for a strategy to protect critical national infrastructure. Estonia, on the other hand, is seeking to develop guidance that comprehensively provides for the dimension of internal security.

Swedish strategy discusses different levels of analysis ranging from the international, to societal, to the individual, and in conclusion stresses the rather nebulous need to protect the security of society at large. Italy has recently witnessed a softening of a state-centred approach and is increasingly stressing the individual as the referent object of security policy. In Finland different

sub-strategies exist that all view the problems at hand through a distinct institutional lens. Institutional ownership of strategies in these cases drives the analysis and policy implications. While these strategies may have found a common denominator in their focus on societal and individual security, their parallel existence actually increases the coordination challenge. Furthermore, the revision and updating of sub-strategies is usually not synchronised which amounts to a wasted opportunity to reap synergy benefits.

The review of government strategies in the FORESEC country reports underlines that a common picture has yet to emerge. Most governments stress the diffuse and complex nature of the threat, the blurring of internal and external security driven by interlinked, asymmetric and de-territorialized challenges involving a multitude of actors (including non-state entities). However, EU member state governments do not have a comparable set of strategies in place across the board, due to a variety of impinging factors, from their perceived role in the world to their geographic location. The level of detail, institutional ownership (and the importance of it for the analysis entailed in those documents) and level of analysis favoured does vary. Thus, while important trends such as an increasing overlap of threat assessments, the perceived need for greater cooperation, and an increasing focus on the concept of individual (human security) are visible, below the EU level we cannot yet witness a coherent treatment of the issues at hand.

### **Technology and Industry: Where One Stands Depends on Where One Sits**

Several EU member states, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom boast a strong defence industrial base and some countries have developed a particular focus on high technology. Key technologies relating to security tend to be defined to a great extent based on these defence industrial capabilities, and national budget allocations for defence technologies.

The defence market operates within different parameters than other fields of economic activity. For example, defence suppliers contract with governments. This means there is a very small set of ultimate customers. As a result, suppliers have a very narrow range of funding sources, and their business is completely dependent on decisions taken by a few clients (governments). Decisions to place business with defence companies generally take into account more than the usual commercial considerations to include the preservation of jobs or the development of a particular area of technology. An additional distorting factor is the practice of 'offset', in which export customers expect suppliers, as a condition of winning orders, to provide industrial benefits, such as the commitment to invest in the contracting country's industries. These benefits can go well beyond the world of defence. Furthermore, because of a growing overlap of the requirements presented by homeland security and defence and the rising importance of information technology, traditional suppliers of defence equipment are increasingly operating alongside businesses from other sectors in an increasingly complex security market.

The existence of a significant defence industrial base can be expected to influence the definition of technology priorities by governments, since a larger base will allow governments greater scope for creatively harnessing this field. However, the shift from the much shielded defence market with high entry barriers to a more open security market together with moves by European companies to position themselves in overseas markets undermines the traditional concept of the defence industrial base as being 'national'. The European Defence Agency has presented a strategy document on the development of a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The former document argues that EU member state governments can no longer economically sustain a defence industrial and technological base on a national level, which was the approach of the past. Furthermore, in a security environment that sees multinational crisis management missions as the predominant framework for the use of armed force, national conceptions were no longer operationally sensible as well.

The FORESEC country reports produced different results in terms of the relationship between industry as a provider of technology-based solutions and government. For example, in Finland the ability of industry to actively shape technology priorities of the government was assessed to be high, in particular because of the overwhelming reliance of the national economy upon a few high technology firms. In Italy, a key finding indicates that different government agencies define technology needs through relatively constrained institutional visions in the absence of overarching guidance. The report on France on the other hand highlights the central role the D el egation G en erale pour l'Armement (DGA), and thus the government, plays in shaping defence industry. In Poland, many of the businesses in this sector remain mostly state-owned.

As described above, nowadays security research and technology priorities are mainly defined in collaboration between defence industry and governments. It was noted in some country reports and by participants at the FORESEC workshop that end users are not adequately involved at times when it comes to shaping priorities. On the other hand, the shift from a state centred security concept towards a comprehensive and citizen centred security concept, acknowledged in the national strategies, should also be emphasized in the assessment of S&T priorities and allocation of R&D funds. The emergence of the domestic security market implies a shifting relationship between civilian and military research and as the reports suggest, the boundaries are lowering and the civilian sector may in the future become the main innovator with new technologies being spun into the military field rather than the other way around. Moreover, for the individual citizen, the changes and overlaps that are taking place in the sphere of internal and external security threats might mean an increase in privately produced security.

### **Societies: Low Threat Perception**

In general, the FORESEC reports show that societies in EU member states feel relatively safe from external threats and do not perceive international security challenges to be among their priority concerns. There are important distinctions to be made in this regard. When asked whether certain issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation or the rise of new powers such as China might represent a security risk a high percentage of EU citizens will say 'yes'. However, if then asked whether they will be directly affected by these challenges the number goes down and when asked about their personal priority concerns these challenges drop to single digits in most cases. On a day-to-day basis, European citizens are much more worried about unemployment, crime, education and the welfare system in general than they are about the key security threats outlined in national strategies and EU security strategy. At the same time, public support for a stronger role of the EU in security policy remains high. However, given the lack of in-depth understanding of major security policy decisions and the general absence of a traditional threat perception focused on key external security risks this support for a stronger a EU role should not be misinterpreted. It would be more accurate to characterise it as benign neglect rather than an active interest in further integration.

This insight is further underlined by the strong impact that current events have on public perceptions and opinion. This is a theme that was also highlighted during the FORESEC workshop: single events can act as catalysts when it comes to public threat perceptions and the sensitivity of populations to security challenges more generally. For example, the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 had a strong influence on how parts of the population view security challenges. In Sweden, the government's perceived under-performance in several emergency management situations left a lasting impression in the electorates mind. In Italy, individual cases have focused public attention on the alleged link between immigration and crime. In the United Kingdom, a debate has ensued about the balance between counter-terrorism legislation and civil liberties whereas in Finland, in the absence of a perceived pressing external threat, social marginalisation has become a major security concern.

This implies that ‘security’ as a concept in public opinion does not exist as such. In some countries security is mostly about safety, in others about economic security – depending very much both on recent events and the level of public well-being. In public opinion security seems to be much more about the freedom from want than it is about the freedom from fear.

### **3. Trends and Threats in Context**

Very broadly speaking, the major threats and trends across the European states surveyed in this report are similar, however, there are clear nuances in public perceptions and the emphasis placed upon different threats. The headings below capture the main threats that came up repeatedly, with a combination of state based and transnational threats observed across the continent. One very broad trend seemed to be the elevated sense of risk from other states amongst larger EU members, while smaller members focused on transnational threats and then framed their responses through an EU framework. The absence of a unifying conventional threat to EU member states since the end of the Cold War along with high levels of prosperity has led to the aforementioned more internally focused conception of security.

Naturally, one of the key determinants of a state’s perception of security is founded in its history – something reflected in Europe in the divide between the states that were behind the Soviet side of the Iron curtain and those not. Those formerly under Soviet rule mostly warmly welcomed NATO membership and have an outlook that reflects an ongoing sense of genuine threat from Russia, and reflecting their commitment to NATO, they also have a tendency to be more open to transatlantic notions of international security threats. However, Eastern concerns are not the only historical characteristic in European security perceptions –the German and Austrian experience during the World Wars has ingrained pacifism and a keenness to rely on multinational institutions, while the Spanish experience under Franco has resulted in a deep resistance to the militarization of domestic security concerns.

#### **Major External Powers**

For many states ensconced amongst likeminded European countries, there was a tendency to no longer think of major powers as a potential security threat. However, this overarching statement is certainly not the case with Russia, which remained a major issue. While many of the reports expressed some concern about Russia as an unpredictable energy supplier, there were interesting nuances to the statements of concern across the member states. Those nearest Russia are burdened with an unfortunate historical baggage that tends to heighten their concerns, but at the same time, this has evolved into a fear towards Russian internal stability and its potentially negative impact on them (in particular amongst those who remain physically vulnerable to woefully underinvested Russian infrastructure). It is also hard to ignore the tendency amongst these states to see NATO as a primary security provider, something that likely reflects the underlying sense of a residual conventional military threat they feel from their dominating neighbour to the East.

The two other geographical regions which were high on the list of threats amongst member states covered (but it is worth highlighting that these concerns were mostly amongst the “big 3” capitals, with more limited expressions elsewhere) – were China and the Middle East. China is seen primarily as a challenge laden with potential benefits, though there are underlying tensions that were mentioned, including China’s deep in-roads into Africa which while not necessarily at odds with European aims, could serve to undermine European efforts on the continent. Chinese militarization of space through recently performed anti-satellite weapons tests was seen as a tangible military risk that could impact European assets, and finally both Russia and China were seen as threats towards cyber-infrastructure and policy makers in both Paris and London expressed concern about increased Chinese and Russian espionage activity.

Amongst the “big 3”, who are directly involved in negotiating with Iran about that country’s nuclear programme, Iran was seen as a major regional threat, both directly, but also as a destabilizing factor. Recent missile tests and ongoing proliferation efforts are understood to be a genuine

security risk amongst policymakers. A greater and more public kind of threat was felt towards the broader region as a potential source of terrorism and a source of socially problematic immigration. Finally, while not necessarily big power related, the threat from fragile and weak states, that become either havens for terrorists or sources of regional instability and migration, while not an issue that really registered in any coherent way in the public mind, remains at the forefront of policymakers concerns.

### **Economics**

Broadly reflecting the basic sense of security in Europe, Eurobarometer and other polls cited throughout reports in this series showed citizens primarily concerned with inflation and rising prices. The potential risks posed by economic volatility and weakened markets to individual prosperity and sense of security was regularly amongst the top concerns. A subset of this threat perception was the fear of increased income disparity and the growing stratification of society. This was seen both at an internal state level, but also transnationally, with income disparities across borders having an impact on migratory patterns. At government level, a concern about demographics and the increased pressure that aging populations will place upon the welfare state and consequently national budgets, raised worries about maintaining levels of military and security spending.

### **Organized crime**

After economics, organized crime remained the most oft cited threat – with a highly elevated sense of concern amongst citizens and governments alike as to the threat posed from organized crime. This was seen from the perspective of drugs trafficking, human smuggling, fraud, and in some states as having undermined central government.

### **Terrorism**

After organized crime, transnational terrorist networks were seen as the next most immediate hard security threat. However, while almost all strategic documents and outlooks list it as a major threat, at a public level, the actual sense of threat is relatively low. This sense is best exemplified by Swedes, who fear terrorism when they are travelling abroad, but not at home. For those thinkers concerned about terrorism, there was an additional geographical element to the threat perception – with most seeing a clear threat emanating from North Africa, while the United Kingdom also remains deeply concerned by South Asia and East Africa. Furthermore the potential societal damage posed by home-grown terror networks poses both an actual threat, but also a potential deepening of social fissures that merely serve to exacerbate the threat further.

### **Energy**

In many cases, energy security was seen broadly under the framework of Russia, as listed above. At another level, growing insatiable energy needs in developing countries were seen as a potential driver for conflict with some level of concern that military confrontation might be sparked off in a world of dwindling hydrocarbons. For some it was inextricably linked to the climate change issue as well, with a growing sense that some return towards nuclear energy might be required.

### **Climate Change**

In many stakeholder interviews and also at the FORESEC workshop, climate change was singled out as one of the most important multipliers of risk. It was argued that, while it was not possible to reverse climate change and its effects, mitigation efforts were crucial. In many strategy documents on the national level, the security implications of climate change are not yet fully explored. However, stakeholders by and large agreed with the characterization of climate change as fuelling a variety of sources of instability and tensions as advanced in a March 2008 joint EU Commission and Council paper on the subject. Several forms of conflict are assessed to be at least in part driven by climate change: resource conflicts (over arable land, water, food); economic conflict caused by risks to coastal regions and critical infrastructure located there; border disputes and

potentially also the loss of territory; environmentally induced migration; fragility because governments might no longer be able to meet basic demands of their citizens; and energy supply.

### **Cyber-threats**

With an increasing dependence on computer and electronic telecommunications systems, the potential risk posed to them of assault by state or non-state actors was raised in a number of states. Amongst states that have particularly high levels of investment in their cyber-infrastructure, like Nordic and Baltic states, this was a particular concern – however, it registered very high amongst larger member states as well. This further blended into the terrorist menace, with growing terrorist reliance upon the internet seen as both a threat in its own right, but also in terms of multiplying the threat by serving as a recruitment, radicalization, and training platform that might engender greater autonomy of terrorist networks.

### **Infrastructure**

There was a common concern across member states about the increasing vulnerability of infrastructure. This extended from cyber-infrastructure to pipelines, transport links, and energy infrastructure more generally. This was seen as a particular internal threat in states like the United Kingdom, but the lack of effective connectivity amongst European states more generally was seen as a potential weakness. Swedes for example, expressed a great sense of concern at potential cascading effects from bad infrastructure in neighbouring states they relied upon for trade and raw materials. Furthermore, for those still connected into aging Russian systems, there was a growing concern about the lack of investment in renovation.

### **Natural Disasters**

This very generic heading encompasses pandemic diseases, and other natural disasters like flooding or earthquakes. Broadly speaking, all of these were listed as high concerns by policymakers, and to a lesser degree the publics. While there has of late been an increased amount of concern about the potential risk from such natural disasters, there is little understanding or ability to quantify the exact threat – though there is a broad sense that government's need to be effectively prepared to deal with the threat. However, apocalyptic scenarios and speculations have somewhat detached this from citizen's immediate lists of concerns. For example, there seems to be little public awareness that events such as floods like the one in the UK in or the heatwave that recently hit France put numbers of citizens at risk of serious injury or death that can be measured in tens of thousands.

### **Immigration**

The reasons for mass immigration are captured in a number of the other threats listed above. However, European citizens' concerns about them span everything from the potential terrorist menace that might follow to major social disparities and frictions to a more mundane fear of elevated criminality. Given demographic trends (which interestingly were only registered as concerns in Bulgaria and Italy), continued stunted economic growth, political instability, and environmental degradation in neighbouring regions like North Africa, this was likely to remain a major concern for the near and long-term future.

In dealing with security challenges, governments will usually make assessments about the likelihood of a particular event happening and of the impact such an event would have on national security. Of primary concern would be those risks that have both a high likelihood of happening and a high impact followed by those with high impact but low likelihood. Of lowest concern, correspondingly also for resource allocation, would be risks assessed to have both a low likelihood and low impact. As becomes clear from FORESEC country reports, there is no undisputed and unifying "number one" threat to EU member states. Instead, European societies face a plethora of security issues that span from natural disasters, to accidents, to malicious acts. However, even such an approach – in some countries such as the UK referred to as an "all threats, all hazards"

approach does not capture all risks perceived by stakeholders to matter, in particular when they are related to individuals' security from want rather than to direct physical harm. As was pointed out during the FORESEC workshop, the foremost demand that arises from this situation is for all actors involved in providing security to be flexible and adaptable in order to have a chance to confront the resulting complexity.

#### **4. Security research and foresight at national level**

Security research is to a great extent conducted from the perspective of state security or defence. It is interesting to note that security research encompassing the more recent broader concept of the word and more traditional "hard" military research are moving closer together. As this broadened concept of security as a field of research is growing in importance, its size is increasing dramatically and there is considerable potential for new and innovative research efforts across the board. Several European countries have established particular security research programmes beyond traditional military research with a special focus on security technologies. There are efforts to coordinate between national and European level security research programmes but so far it has not been adequate and both gaps and duplication occur.

Security related foresight work is mainly carried out, at a national level, by the Ministry of Defence, often in connection with the development of national security strategies. In some cases the scenarios remain classified and beyond public reach. At the same time, other non-classified efforts are regularly occurring elsewhere, either within the broader security apparatus, or in the public and non-governmental sectors. The field of foresight activities at national level is thusly highly fragmented and lacks coordination, making it a considerable challenge to disseminate the results of the foresight activities effectively in order for them to have an impact on decision-making. In addition, stakeholders highlighted the fact that end users in the security field have in the past been unlikely to become involved in foresight activities beyond their respective organizations.

#### **5. European Level Collaboration**

The scan tried to identify areas of security research which were perceived to be ones in which there would be added value from greater European level collaboration. It should be noted however that the notion of cooperation as being beneficial almost by definition did not go unchallenged during the FORESEC kick-off workshop. Some participants pointed out that cooperation on the national level would have to be improved before serious attempts at further EU-level cooperation could be undertaken. Others maintained that the real problem was implementation of what has already been agreed and cautioned that EU member states would have to make better use of existing institutions rather than engage in establishing more. Yet another group felt that national priorities remained too different and diverse. Thus, coordination of research was not necessarily a good thing. It was asked, if there was no consensus on priorities, then why have a coordinated approach?

However, there was a wide recognition that as the majority of the trends and threats are transnational, and thusly require multilateral responses, the EU becomes a major player in addressing them. In terms of priorities for security research the added value exists both in pooling resources, but also in understanding in a comprehensive manner the societal and human dynamics of security as it is defined across states, as well as in technological responses across Europe. Cross-border technological investment in Europe was broadly seen through two prisms: on the one hand as technologies that reflected Europe's deepening integration, and on the other as high investment technologies that individual member states would have difficulty affording by themselves.

### **Radicalisation and marginalisation**

Societal trends such as radicalisation and marginalisation require further research at the correct level as different countries are at different stages regarding this issue (both at the conceptual and action level). Research conducted on marginalisation and radicalisation at European level should correspond to the multiple realities in the different European societies.

### **Standardized Risk/Crisis Management**

As evidenced by the wide array of different threat perceptions and reactions to risk presented in this report, with parallel deepening of European integration, there is a clear need for greater investment in establishing a common set of best practice and tools to manage crisis effectively. At the same time, in the military field, this is reflected in the growing need for greater common understanding of how to address counter-insurgency and stability operations.

### **Improving Citizen Awareness of threats**

Potentially connected to a more effective exploitation of online tools, a more rapid citizen awareness network was mentioned a number of times as a tool that could benefit from European investment, and raise Europe's credibility and reason in citizen's eyes.

### **Better Understanding of What Russia wants**

This could largely seem an academic exercise outside the technological realm, however, the concern with which many European's view Russia and the lack of a coherent policy towards the nation upon which it is so highly dependent, presents a potentially toxic combination for Europe. Some investment in academic research and the development of a coherent European strategy was cited as a crucial, as well as greater investment in building stronger public links and deepening cooperation in the more traditional security realms.

### **Borders**

There was a sense that greater investment was required in improving border security. Improving border checks and strengthening Europe's borders was seen as key in countering transnational terrorism and organized crime. This is an issue of both greater investment in personnel capacity and technological capabilities. Border control was also singled out as an area where existing institutions could be put to better value.

### **Critical National Infrastructure**

Greater coordination was seen as essential in protecting critical national infrastructure, both in cyber and solid – given Europe's increasingly integrated nature, this was seen as a growing gap in European capabilities. While some steps have been made towards European coordination, the potential risks of infrastructure failures in one nation having a catastrophic cascading effect upon neighbours highlighted the need for further European cooperation.

### **Improving European level cross-border Counter-terror and organized crime efforts**

Almost a subset of the aforementioned border concerns, the particularly transborder nature of the threat posed by international terrorism and organized crime is something that would benefit from greater European coordination. One specific technology cited that would help with this is open source technology.

### **Common airspace technologies**

Given the increasing openness of European skies, and the growing number of planes flying through common airspaces, the risk of accidents or misunderstandings is elevated. In 2007, more than 10 million flights operated in European airspace. Increasing investment in common airspace technologies will increase safety, but will also lead to a greater protection from outside airborne threats.

### **Space-based defence**

Greater investment in space-based technologies, either intelligence assets or defensive tools was seen as a crucial asset that Europe should invest in, in particular from the perspective of France and the UK. It is worth highlighting that this was seen as a commercial and defence benefit, with an ideal scenario involving some blend of the two.

### **Guided Weapons technology**

Increasingly precise and effective weapons were seen as a key point of investment in some states whereas others were not focused on such big-ticket items. Given that all-weather precision strike and stand-off capabilities reduce the risk to both European troops deployed on operations and also the risk of collateral damage, the increased effectiveness that guided weapons might bring is valued in the context of modern operations which are almost always conducted in the pursuit of limited political objectives and with fragile domestic public support.

### **Environmental technologies**

Europe is already seen as a leader in environmental technologies, further investment in this field may give Europe an added advantage as the rest of the world increasingly turns to such technologies. Desalination technologies, climate change technologies in adaptation and preservation terms, and protective measures to mitigate the results of climate change were repeatedly mentioned as priorities during research interviews with stakeholders.

### **Energy**

Investment in the European energy sector should be driven along a number of crucial strands: the establishment of a Centre for Excellence for energy studies; the better development of carbon capture technologies; improving buildings energy efficiency; as well as better investment and exploitation of renewable energy sources. The question was posed whether Europe needed to return to greater investment in nuclear energy after several countries such as Germany and Sweden have adopted nuclear phase-out policies.

## **6. Conclusion**

**EU member states' governments do not have a comparable set of security strategies or priorities in place across the board to address adequately the current security challenges Europe faces.** The review of government strategies in the FORESEC country reports underlines that a common picture has yet to emerge. The level of detail, institutional ownership (and the importance of it for the analysis entailed in those documents) and level of analysis favoured varies widely, in part due to geographical and historical contexts.

However, the scan observes an increasing overlap of threat assessment in different EU member states. **The major threats and trends across the European state surveyed in this report are somewhat similar, however, there are clear nuances in public and government perceptions and the emphasis placed upon different threats.** Most governments stress the diffuse and complex nature of the threat, the blurring of internal and external security driven by interlinked, asymmetric and de-territorialized challenges involving a multitude of actors (including non-state entities).

**Maintaining European security requires a comprehensive approach both at national and European level.** Governments are trying to create a more joined-up policy resulting from an interagency process involving a wide range of – or even all – cabinet ministries and actors from the private sector and civil society. While progress is undeniable, success is so far limited not the least because fragmentation also stems from a number of distinct lenses through which security can be analyzed within member states. Because of these different approaches there seems to be a lack of understanding of the linkages of technological and societal issues, between hard external threats

and more domestic concerns, and there is a clear need to better link security research to the overall strategies and policies contributing to European security.

**National security research and foresight activities are not adequately coordinated with the European level research programmes resulting in gaps and overlap between activities.**

Furthermore, it seems questionable whether current divisions in research programmes along the two key dimensions (internal versus external security and civilian versus military means) can be maintained. While there may be valid institutional concerns about blurring these lines and associated boundaries of responsibility, artificial divides that do not correspond to the observed reality would certainly lead to sub-optimal results.

**There is an increased focus on the citizen as the object of security.** The European Security Strategy and many national policy documents have now focused on the individual in acknowledgement of the concept of human security which puts the premium on this level. Threat assessments also highlight that, for the foreseeable future, threats to EU member states will not jeopardize their existential security making the shift to human security somewhat easier. This does not amount to the negation of traditional security threats – while Europe’s largely peaceful neighbourhood has engendered a sense of absence of external threats, policy makers maintain an active awareness of the potential of threats to return and consequently there is a need to maintain an effective balance between this new conception of security and more established ones. Furthermore, the critical need for strong expeditionary forces trained in stability operations to enhance security through the many on-going crisis management operations that EU member states are engaged in, be it through the EU, UN, NATO, or coalitions of the willing, has to be underlined and is a key focus of defence reform programmes in the countries surveyed.

**There is increasing debate about whose responsibility the provision of security is:** it has traditionally understood to be the domain of the state and national governments. However, at a time when, for example, critical infrastructure is owned mostly by private companies, this conception is too narrow and it becomes harder to allocate absolute responsibility upon private actors or necessarily dictate how they will respond in a crisis situation. In resilience terms and terms of preparedness, ownership extends even beyond the private sector to the individual. Security has thus become the joint responsibility of the state and society at large including the private sector.

With the participatory elements in FORESEC increasing from here on, the preliminary findings presented in this synthesis report will no doubt have to be revisited. However, a baseline for the next stage of the FORESEC project has been established.